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In the private sector, "unionization" typically refers to employees who are organized, recognized, and covered by contracts, according to the procedures established by the National Labor Relations Board. The municipal sector provides an instructive contrast. There, "unionization" encompasses five mutually exclusive combinations of organizational structure and labor relations practice. These "modes" form a hierarchy of employee power, from strongest to weakest: recognized bargaining units, unrecognized unions in cities which contain other recognized unions, unorganized employees in cities which contain recognized unions,unrecognized unions in cities which contain no recognized unions, and unorganized employees in cities which contain no recognized unions. Differences in the effects of each mode on compensation for municipal employees demonstrate differences in the intrinsic strength of different union institutions. Municipal compensation levels are dramatically higher for employees represented by more powerful modes of unionization, regardless of other conditions in factor and output markets. Union effects on total compensation, in comparison to its mean, range from 3.8% for unrecognized unions in cities which contain no recognized bargaining units, to 11.8% for recognized bargaining units, themselves. In addition, union effects on total compensation are reater than union effects an wages in all modes. Relative union effects on expenditures for paid time not worked and pension benefits are usually more than twice wage effects. Union effects on medical benefits are nearly twice wage effects.
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This paper presents an analysis of employment and compensation practices under alternative institutions of municipal government which demonstrates that institutional variations have significant, important, and predictable effects upon outcomes in municipal labor markets. Municipal institutions in which a single official is responsible for office performance provide that official with incentives to emphasize efficiency in the production of municipal services. Institutions in which responsibility is shared provide individual officials with incentives to emphasize the allocation of municipal resources to their particular constituencies, among whom municipal employees may be prominent. Independently, city managers and mayors chosen through direct election reduce levels of employment and increase employee compensation. Managers offer compensation packages which emphasize nonwage components. In cities which have both institutions, competition between the two nullifies employment reductions and exacerbates compensation increases. Employment increases with the age of the manager's office. City council members chosen through at-large or nonpartisan elections increase levels of both employment and compensation. Compensation packages under both emphasize current components. With both reforms, employment and compensation increases are compounded.
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Municipal government --- Municipal officials and employees --- History
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Leadership. --- Municipal government. --- Municipal officials and employees.
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Local elections --- Municipal officials and employees --- Parti socialiste (France)
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Municipal government --- Municipal officials and employees --- Personnel management
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Municipal officials and employees --- History. --- Schaffhausen (Switzerland) --- Officials and employees
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Municipal officials and employees --- Labor unions --- Municipal employees