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The literature measuring the impact of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) and WTO membership on trade flows has produced remarkably diverse results. Rose's (2004) seminal paper reports a range of specifications that show no WTO effects, but Subramanian and Wei (2007) contend that he does not fully control for multilateral resistance (which could bias WTO estimates). Subramanian and Wei (2007) address multilateral resistance comprehensively to report strong WTO trade effects for industrialized countries but do not account for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity (which could inflate WTO estimates). We unify these two approaches by accounting for both multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, while also allowing for individual trade effects of PTAs. WTO effects vanish and remain insignificant throughout once multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual PTA effects are introduced. The result is robust to the use of alternative definitions and coding conventions for WTO membership that have been employed by Rose (2004), Tomz et al. (2007), or by Subramanian and Wei's (2007).

Commerce --- Business & Economics --- International Commerce --- Terms of trade. --- Tariff preferences. --- Differential duty --- Discriminating duty --- Generalized system of preferences (Tariff) --- GSP (Tariff) --- Preferences, Tariff --- Preferential duty --- Preferential tariff --- Trade preferences --- Tariff --- Competition, International --- Prices --- Exports and Imports --- Trade Policy --- International Trade Organizations --- Empirical Studies of Trade --- Trade: General --- International economics --- Trade agreements --- Trade balance --- Plurilateral trade --- Imports --- North American Free Trade Agreement --- Commercial treaties --- Balance of trade --- International trade --- Luxembourg

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Trade theories covering Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are as diverse as the literature in search of their empirical support. To account for the model uncertainty that surrounds the validity of the competing PTA theories, we introduce Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to the PTA literature. BMA minimizes the sum of Type I and Type II error, the mean squared error, and generates predictive distributions with optimal predictive performance. Once model uncertainty is addressed as part of the empirical strategy, we report clear evidence of Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, and Open Bloc effects. After controlling for natural trading partner effects, Trade Creation is weaker - except for the EU. To calculate the actual effects of PTAs on trade flows we show that the analysis must be comprehensive: it must control for Trade Creation and Diversion as well as all possible PTAs. Several prominent control variables are also shown to be robustly related to Trade Creation; they relate to factor endowments and economic policy.

International trade --- Commercial treaties --- Tariff preferences --- Differential duty --- Discriminating duty --- Generalized system of preferences (Tariff) --- GSP (Tariff) --- Preferences, Tariff --- Preferential duty --- Preferential tariff --- Trade preferences --- Tariff --- Trade agreements (Commerce) --- Competition, International --- Foreign trade regulation --- Treaties --- Reciprocity (Commerce) --- Econometric models. --- Exports and Imports --- Econometrics --- Trade Policy --- International Trade Organizations --- Empirical Studies of Trade --- Bayesian Analysis: General --- International economics --- Bayesian inference --- Trade balance --- Trade agreements --- Plurilateral trade --- North American Free Trade Agreement --- Customs unions --- Bayesian models --- Econometric analysis --- Balance of trade --- Protectionism --- Econometric models --- Chile

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Foreign trade policy --- Developing countries --- Tariff --- Tariff preferences --- 339.54 --- 339.96 --- 800 Collectie Vlaams Vredesinstituut --- 813 Methodologie --- 822.1 Verenigde Naties --- 822.5 Europese Unie --- 825 Ontwikkelingssamenwerking --- 831 Internationale Politieke Economie --- 831.1 Handelspolitiek --- 882.4 Noord-Amerika --- 883.2 Oost-Azië --- Buitenlandse economische politiek. Buitenlandse handelspolitiek. Instrumentarium van de buitenlandse handel --- Ontwikkelingshulp. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Ontwikkelingsproblematiek --- 339.96 Ontwikkelingshulp. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Ontwikkelingsproblematiek --- 339.54 Buitenlandse economische politiek. Buitenlandse handelspolitiek. Instrumentarium van de buitenlandse handel --- Differential duty --- Discriminating duty --- Generalized system of preferences (Tariff) --- GSP (Tariff) --- Preferences, Tariff --- Preferential duty --- Preferential tariff --- Trade preferences

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Preferential trade agreements have become common ways to protect or restrict access to national markets in products and services. The United States has signed trade agreements with almost two dozen countries as close as Mexico and Canada and as distant as Morocco and Australia. The European Union has done the same. In addition to addressing economic issues, these agreements also regulate the protection of human rights. In Forced to Be Good, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton tells the story of the politics of such agreements and of the ways in which governments pursue market integration policies that advance their own political interests, including human rights. How and why do global norms for social justice become international regulations linked to seemingly unrelated issues, such as trade? Hafner-Burton finds that the process has been unconventional. Efforts by human rights advocates and labor unions to spread human rights ideals, for example, do not explain why American and European governments employ preferential trade agreements to protect human rights. Instead, most of the regulations protecting human rights are codified in global moral principles and laws only because they serve policymakers' interests in accumulating power or resources or solving other problems. Otherwise, demands by moral advocates are tossed aside. And, as Hafner-Burton shows, even the inclusion of human rights protections in trade agreements is no guarantee of real change, because many of the governments that sign on to fair trade regulations oppose such protections and do not intend to force their implementation. Ultimately, Hafner-Burton finds that, despite the difficulty of enforcing good regulations and the less-than-noble motives for including them, trade agreements that include human rights provisions have made a positive difference in the lives of some of the people they are intended-on paper, at least-to protect.

Tariff preferences --- Commercial treaties --- International trade --- Human rights --- Préférences douanières --- Accords commerciaux --- Commerce international --- Droits de l'homme (Droit international) --- Social aspects. --- Economic aspects. --- Aspect social --- Aspect économique --- POLITICAL SCIENCE --- International Relations / Trade & Tariffs --- Commerce --- Business & Economics --- International Commerce --- Social aspects --- Economic aspects --- Préférences douanières --- Aspect économique --- Basic rights --- Civil rights (International law) --- Rights, Human --- Rights of man --- Trade agreements (Commerce) --- Differential duty --- Discriminating duty --- Generalized system of preferences (Tariff) --- GSP (Tariff) --- Preferences, Tariff --- Preferential duty --- Preferential tariff --- Trade preferences --- Law and legislation --- Human security --- Transitional justice --- Truth commissions --- Competition, International --- Foreign trade regulation --- Treaties --- Reciprocity (Commerce) --- Tariff

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Tariff preferences --- -Developing Countries --- AA / International- internationaal --- 334.153.1 --- Differential duty --- Discriminating duty --- Generalized system of preferences (Tariff) --- GSP (Tariff) --- Preferences, Tariff --- Preferential duty --- Preferential tariff --- Trade preferences --- Tariff --- Commerce --- -Handel, douanetarief en handelsakkoorden in de Europese Gemeenschappen. --- European Economic Community countries --- -Common market countries --- European common market countries --- Europe --- -Tariff preferences --- Developing Countries --- -Commerce --- Handel, douanetarief en handelsakkoorden in de Europese Gemeenschappen --- Developing countries --- Common market countries --- Emerging nations --- Fourth World --- Global South --- LDC's --- Least developed countries --- Less developed countries --- Newly industrialized countries --- Newly industrializing countries --- NICs (Newly industrialized countries) --- Third World --- Underdeveloped areas --- Underdeveloped countries