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Here, in a new edition, is Nelson Goodmans provocative philosophical classica book that, according to Science, raised a storm of controversy when it was first published in 1954, and one that remains on the front lines of philosophical debate. How is it that we feel confident in generalizing from experience in some ways but not in others? How are generalizations that are warranted to be distinguished from those that are not? Goodman shows that these questions resist formal solution and his demonstration has been taken by nativists like Chomsky and Fodor as proof that neither scientific induction nor ordinary learning can proceed without an a priori, or innate, ordering of hypotheses.
Logic --- Philosophy of science --- wetenschapsfilosofie --- logica --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Forecasting --- Induction (Logic) --- Possibility --- Science --- -Natural science --- Science of science --- Sciences --- Philosophy --- Inductive logic --- Logic, Inductive --- Reasoning --- Forecasts --- Futurology --- Prediction --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Forecasting. --- Possibility. --- Conditionnels (Logique) --- Prévision --- Induction (Logique) --- Possibilité --- Philosophy. --- Philosophie --- -Philosophy --- -Logic --- Natural science --- Prévision --- Possibilité --- -Inductive logic --- Normal science --- Wetenschapsfilosofie --- Logica
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Logic --- Philosophy of language --- Mathematical logic --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Reasoning --- Probabilities --- Conditionnels (Logique) --- Raisonnement --- Probabilités --- Counterfactuals (Logic) --- Argumentation --- Ratiocination --- Reason --- Thought and thinking --- Judgment (Logic) --- Probability --- Statistical inference --- Combinations --- Mathematics --- Chance --- Least squares --- Mathematical statistics --- Risk --- Contrary-to-fact conditional --- Counterfactual conditionals --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Probabilities. --- Reasoning. --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Counterfactuals (Logic). --- Probabilités
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Induction (Logic) --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Possibility --- Forecasting --- Science --- Philosophy --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Forecasting. --- Induction (Logic). --- Possibility. --- Philosophy. --- Induction (Logique) --- Conditionnels (Logique) --- Possibilité --- Prévision --- Sciences --- Philosophie --- Normal science --- Philosophy of science --- Inductive logic --- Logic, Inductive --- Forecasts --- Futurology --- Prediction --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Logic --- Reasoning --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Science - Philosophy
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Induction (Logic) --- Probabilities --- Belief and doubt --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Hume, David, --- Harrod, Roy, --- Evidence --- Probability --- Statistical inference --- Combinations --- Mathematics --- Chance --- Least squares --- Mathematical statistics --- Risk --- Proof --- Faith --- Logic --- Philosophy --- Truth --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Harrod, Roy Forbes Sir --- Hume, David --- ヒューム --- Probabilities. --- Induction (Logic). --- Inductive logic --- Logic, Inductive --- Reasoning --- Hume, David, - 1711-1776 --- Harrod, Roy, - 1900-1978 - Foundations of inductive logic
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This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonic logic are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked.
Commonsense reasoning. --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Hypothesis. --- Induction (Logic) --- Inference. --- Nonmonotonic reasoning. --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Induction (Logic). --- Commonsense reasoning --- Hypothesis --- Inference --- Nonmonotonic reasoning --- Non-monotonic reasoning --- Reasoning --- Ampliative induction --- Induction, Ampliative --- Inference (Logic) --- Inductive logic --- Logic, Inductive --- Logic --- Assumption --- Supposition --- Science --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Common sense reasoning --- Methodology --- Induction (logique) --- Arts and Humanities --- Philosophy --- Philosophie --- Artificial intelligence --- Logique --- Knowledge representation
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This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses.
Logic --- Lexicology. Semantics --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Truth --- Belief and doubt --- Psychology --- Conditionnels (Logique) --- Vérité --- Croyance et doute --- Psychologie --- 800.1 --- Conviction --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism --- Behavioral sciences --- Mental philosophy --- Mind --- Science, Mental --- Human biology --- Soul --- Mental health --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Taalfilosofie --- Belief and doubt. --- Psychology. --- Truth. --- 800.1 Taalfilosofie --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Vérité --- Arts and Humanities
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Mathematical logic --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Modality (Logic) --- Semantics (Philosophy) --- Conditionnels (Logique) --- Modalité (Logique) --- Sémantique (Philosophie) --- Intension (Philosophy) --- Logical semantics --- Semantics (Logic) --- Semeiotics --- Significs --- Syntactics --- Unified science --- Language and languages --- Logic, Symbolic and mathematical --- Logical positivism --- Meaning (Psychology) --- Philosophy, Modern --- Semiotics --- Signs and symbols --- Symbolism --- Analysis (Philosophy) --- Definition (Philosophy) --- Modal logic --- Logic --- Nonclassical mathematical logic --- Bisimulation --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Modality (Logic). --- Semantics (Philosophy). --- Modalité (Logique) --- Sémantique (Philosophie)
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Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon.
Belief change. --- Science -- Philosophy. --- Science --- Belief change --- Physical Sciences & Mathematics --- Philosophy & Religion --- Sciences - General --- Philosophy --- Nonmonotonic reasoning. --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Formalization (Philosophy) --- Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Non-monotonic reasoning --- Philosophy. --- Logic. --- Philosophy and science. --- Philosophy of Science. --- Form (Philosophy) --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Logic --- Methodology --- Psychology --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Reasoning --- Argumentation --- Deduction (Logic) --- Deductive logic --- Dialectic (Logic) --- Logic, Deductive --- Intellect --- Thought and thinking --- Normal science --- Philosophy of science --- Science and philosophy
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Logic --- Philosophy of language --- Mathematical logic --- Philosophy of science --- Probability theory --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Probabilities. --- Decision making. --- Chance. --- Time. --- Conditionnels (Logique) --- Probabilités --- Prise de décision --- Hasard --- Temps --- Probabilities --- Decision Making --- Chance --- Time --- Decision making --- Deciding --- Decision (Psychology) --- Decision analysis --- Decision processes --- Making decisions --- Management --- Management decisions --- Choice (Psychology) --- Problem solving --- Hours (Time) --- Geodetic astronomy --- Nautical astronomy --- Horology --- Probability --- Statistical inference --- Combinations --- Mathematics --- Least squares --- Mathematical statistics --- Risk --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Fortune --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Probabilités --- Prise de décision
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Conditionals are omnipresent, in everyday life as well as in scientific environments; they represent generic knowledge acquired inductively or learned from books. They tie a flexible and highly interrelated network of connections along which reasoning is possible and which can be applied to different situations. Therefore, conditionals are important, but also quite problematic objects in knowledge representation. This book presents a new approach to conditionals which captures their dynamic, non-proportional nature particularly well by considering conditionals as agents shifting possible worlds in order to establish relationships and beliefs. This understanding of conditionals yields a rich theory which makes complex interactions between conditionals transparent and operational. Moreover,it provides a unifying and enhanced framework for knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, belief revision,and even for knowledge discovery.
Nonmonotonic reasoning. --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Nonmonotonic reasoning --- Computer Science --- Engineering & Applied Sciences --- Conditionals (Logic). --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Non-monotonic reasoning --- Computer science. --- Mathematical logic. --- Artificial intelligence. --- Computer Science. --- Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics). --- Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages. --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Logic --- Reasoning --- Artificial Intelligence. --- Informatics --- Science --- AI (Artificial intelligence) --- Artificial thinking --- Electronic brains --- Intellectronics --- Intelligence, Artificial --- Intelligent machines --- Machine intelligence --- Thinking, Artificial --- Bionics --- Cognitive science --- Digital computer simulation --- Electronic data processing --- Logic machines --- Machine theory --- Self-organizing systems --- Simulation methods --- Fifth generation computers --- Neural computers --- Algebra of logic --- Logic, Universal --- Mathematical logic --- Symbolic and mathematical logic --- Symbolic logic --- Mathematics --- Algebra, Abstract --- Metamathematics --- Set theory --- Syllogism