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Procurement packaging has important effects on not only the bidders' bidding behavior, but also contractors' performance. By changing the size of public contracts, procurers can encourage (or discourage) market competition and improve contract performance, avoiding unnecessary cost overruns and project delays. In practice, there is no single solution about how to package public contracts. With procurement data from road projects in Nepal, this paper examines the optimal size of road contracts in rural areas. The optimum varies depending on policy objectives. To maximize the bidder participation, the length of road should be about 11 kilometers. To minimize cost overruns and delays, the contracts should be much larger at 17 and 21 kilometers, respectively. Compared with the current procurement practices, the findings suggest that procurers take more advantage of enlarging road packages, although contracts that are too large may increase the risk of discouraging firms from participating in public tenders.

Competition --- Contract Law --- Debt Markets --- Government Procurement --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market entry --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Public procurement --- Rural roads, auction theory --- Transport --- Transport Economics Policy & Planning

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Transport infrastructure is important for economic growth. In Nepal, about 20 percent of rural residents have to spend more than 3 hours to go to the nearest marketplace or agriculture center. Public procurement is an important policy instrument to use resources wisely and efficiently. This paper analyzes a series of policy questions, from procurement design to contract management and project quality assurance. The paper finds that the competition effect is significant. To enhance competition, bidding documents can be distributed free of charge on a website. The bid preparation period can be extended. Security issues are also found to be particularly important to avoid unnecessary cost overruns and project delays. Heavy rainfall and the bidders' low-balling strategy are identified as other factors of project delays. The quality of roads would deteriorate with not only security incidence but also time, precipitation and traffic volume.

Auction Theory --- Competition --- Debt Markets --- Ethnicity --- Governance --- Government Procurement --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Market Entry --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Public Procurement --- Rural Development --- Rural Roads --- Transport --- Transport Economics Policy & Planning --- Weather

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This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Microeconomics --- Auctions --- Mathematical models --- Mathematical models. --- Business, Economy and Management --- Economics --- Privatization. --- Denationalization --- Privatisation --- Contracting out --- Corporatization --- Government ownership --- Dutch auctions --- Vendues --- Bailments --- Commercial law --- 303.8 --- 305.6 --- 305.971 --- AA / International- internationaal --- Econometrische behandeling van een onderwerp --- Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen --- Speciale gevallen in econometrische modelbouw --- Auction theory. --- Game theory --- Auctions - Mathematical models --- Money market. Capital market

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This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.

Microeconomics --- Methodology of economics --- Operational research. Game theory --- -economie --- 338.313 --- 330.52 --- economische leerstelsels --- 330.0724 --- Kapitalisme. --- Liberaal systeem. Neo-liberalisme. Theorie van de onderhandeling. --- -330.0724 --- Experimental economics --- economie --- theories economiques --- 305.6 --- 330.3 --- AA / International- internationaal --- NBB congres --- 330.1 --- 330.1 Economische grondbegrippen. Algemene begrippen in de economie --- Economische grondbegrippen. Algemene begrippen in de economie --- Economics --- economische theorieen --- Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen --- Methode in staathuishoudkunde. Statische, dynamische economie. Modellen. Experimental economics --- Liberaal systeem. Neo-liberalisme. Theorie van de onderhandeling --- Kapitalisme --- Methodology --- Economie politique --- Méthodologie --- Experimental economics. --- Wirtschaftswissenschaften. --- Wirtschaftsforschung. --- Methode. --- Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung. --- Experiment. --- Economics - Methodology --- Battle of the Sexes game. --- Dutch auction. --- Ellsberg paradox. --- Lindahl equilibrium. --- Lindahl mechanism. --- Nash bargaining theory. --- Prisoner's Dilemma. --- Vickery auction. --- adaptive models. --- auction theory studies. --- blind-bid auction. --- call market. --- description invariance. --- efficient outcomes. --- fanning in hypothesis. --- focal points. --- futures market. --- illusion of control. --- impunity games. --- infinite horizon game. --- mechanism design. --- options market. --- posted-bid auctions. --- price list auction. --- scoring rules. --- simulation, computer. --- trigger strategies. --- Experimentelles Arbeiten --- Laborexperiment --- Test --- Freihandversuch --- Versuch --- Laborversuch --- Experimente --- Experimentelle Ökonomik --- Experimentelle Ökonomie --- Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung --- Methodik --- Verfahren --- Technik --- Methoden --- Methodologie --- Wirtschaftswissenschaften --- Ökonomie --- Wirtschaftswissenschaft --- Forschung --- SCIENCE ECONOMIQUE --- METHODOLOGIE