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Philosophy of nature --- --Aristotle --- Space and time --- Aristote, --- Physique --- Aristotle --- Time --- Philosophy --- Aristotle - Physics - Book 4, 10-14

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Philosophy of nature --- Philosophie de la nature --- Early works to 1800 --- Ouvrages avant 1800 --- Aristotle --- Aristoteles. --- Aristoteles --- Aristote --- Aristotile --- Aristotle. --- Aristotle - Physics - Book 2

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In this commentary on Aristotle Physics book eight, chapters one to five, the sixth-century philosopher Simplicius quotes and explains important fragments of the Presocratic philosophers, provides the fragments of his Christian opponent Philoponus' Against Aristotle On the Eternity of the World, and makes extensive use of the lost commentary of Aristotle's leading defender, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Aristotle's Physics Book 3 covers two subjects: the definition of change and the finitude of the universe. Change enters into the very definition of nature as an internal source of change. Change receives two definitions in chapters 1 and 2, as involving the actualisation of the potential or of the changeable. Alexander of Aphrodisias is reported as thinking that the second version is designed to show that Book 3, like Book 5, means to disqualify change in relations from being genuine change. Book 2 of the Physics is arguably the best introduction to Aristotle's ideas, as well as being the most interesting and representative book in the whole of his corpus. It defines nature and distinguishes natural science from mathematics. It introduces the seminal idea of four causes, or four modes of explanation. It defines chance, but rejects a theory of chance and natural selection in favour of purpose in nature. Simplicius' greatest contribution in his commentary on Aristotle on Physics 1.5-9 lies in his treatment of matter. The sixth-century philosopher starts with a valuable elucidation of what Aristotle means by 'principle' and 'element' in Physics. In the volume 1.3-4 Simplicius deals with Aristotle's account of the Presocratics, and for many of them he is our chief or even sole authority. He quotes at length from Melissus, Parmenides and Zeno, sometimes from their original works but also from later writers from Plato onwards, drawing particularly on Alexander's lost commentary on Aristotle's Physics and on Porphyry. Much of his approach is just scholarly, but in places he reveals his Neoplatonist affiliation and attempts to show the basic agreement among his predecessors in spite of their apparent differences.

Philosophy of nature --- Aristotle --- Book 1 Space and time --- Space and time --- Physics --- Aristotle. --- Aristotle. Physics. --- Early works to 1800. --- Philosophie antique --- Aristote, --- Philosophie antique. --- Aristote --- Physics (Aristotle) --- Nature --- Chance --- Science, Ancient --- Physica (Aristoteles). --- Aristoteles, --- Physics. --- Physics (Aristotle). --- Aristotle. Physics Space and time --- Aristote (0384-0322 av. J.-C.). --- Science, Ancient. --- Espace et temps --- Physique --- Ouvrages avant 1800 --- Philoponus, John,

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Este libro examina la teoría del azar de Aristóteles, presentada en Phys. II 4-6, en el contexto de la discusión de los principios y causas de la filosofía natural. Teniendo siempre en vista este contexto, la autora elabora una interpretación de la definición genérica de azar como un cierto tipo de relación causal accidental, mostrando posteriormente cómo las dos especies de azar que distingue Aristóteles en Phys. II 6 (týche y autómaton) comparten dicha estructura común. En esta tarea, resulta relevante el esclarecimiento del modo específico en que este tipo de causalidad se da en la naturaleza y en la acción humana. Más allá de las cuestiones puramente exegéticas, el estudio considera que la concepción de Phys. II 4-6 es portadora de genuino interés filosófico, en la medida en que Aristóteles intenta dar cuenta del azar tomándolo como un fenómeno irreductible cuyas condiciones de posibilidad procura esclarecer, antes que como una mera apariencia que deba ser eliminada por la reflexión filosófica. En tal medida, su concepción de la fortuna (týche) puede ser puesta en diálogo fructífero, todavía hoy, con aproximaciones de corte eliminativo a este mismo fenómeno.The work presented here delves into Aristotle's theory of chance in Phys. II 4-6, a text found within the discussion about the principles and causes of natural philosophy. Always having this context in view, the author offers an interpretation of the generic definition of chance as a certain kind of accidental causal relation, and shows later how both species of chance distinguished by Aristotle in Phys. II 6 (týche and autómaton) share that common structure. On this reading, it becomes relevant to clarify at the same time the specific mode that this kind of causality adopts in nature and in human agency. Beyond pure exegetical questions, the book considers that the account of chance in Phys. II 4-6 bears philosophical interest, for Aristotle sets out to explain chance taking it as an irreducible phenomenon whose conditions of possibility tries to clarify, rather than taking it as a deceptive appearance which should be eliminated by philosophical reflection. To that extent, Aristotle's account of luck (týche) is shown to be worth considering, even today, as a genuine philosophical alternative to eliminative accounts of this phenomenon

Causation. --- Chance --- Causalité --- Hasard --- Philosophy --- Philosophie --- Aristotle. --- Causation --- Aristotle --- Causalité --- Fortune --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Probabilities --- Causality --- Cause and effect --- Effect and cause --- Final cause --- Beginning --- God --- Metaphysics --- Teleology --- Chance - Philosophy --- Aristotle - Physics - Book 2, 4-6

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Aristotle's account of place, in which he defined a thing's place as the inner surface of its nearest immobile container, was supported by the Latin Middle Ages, even 1600 years after his death, though it had not convinced many ancient Greek philosophers. The sixth century commentator Philoponus took a more common-sense view. For him, place was an immobile three-dimensional extension, whose essence did not preclude its being empty, even if for other reasons it had always to be filled with body. However, Philoponus reserved his own definition for an excursus, already translated in this series, The Corollary on Place. In the text translated here he wanted instead to explain Aristotle's view to elementary students. The recent conjecture that he wished to attract young fellow Christians away from the official pagan professor of philosophy in Alexandria has the merit of explaining why he expounds Aristotle here, rather than attacking him. But he still puts the students through their paces, for example when discussing Aristotle's claim that place cannot be a body, or two bodies would coincide. Philoponus has been identified as the founder in dynamics of the theory of impetus, an inner force impressed from without, which, in its later recurrence, has been hailed as a scientific revolution. His commentary is translated here without the previously translated excursus, the Corollary on Void, also available in this series. Philoponus rejects Aristotle's attack on the very idea of void and of the possibility of motion in it, even though he thinks that void never occurs in fact. Philoponus' argument was later to be praised by Galileo. Philoponus' commentary on the last part of Aristotle's Physics Book 4 does not offer major alternatives to Aristotle's science, as did his commentary on the earlier parts, concerning place, vacuum and motion in a vacuum. Aristotle's subject here is time, and his treatment of it had led to controversy in earlier writers. Philoponus does offer novelties when he treats motion round a bend as in one sense faster than motion on the straight over the same distance in the same time, because of the need to consider the greater effort involved. And he points out that in an earlier commentary on Book 8 he had argued against Aristotle for the possibility of a last instant of time.

Physics --- Philosophy. --- Aristotle. --- Aristoteles. --- Science, Ancient --- Time --- Sciences anciennes --- Physique --- Temps --- Early works to 1800. --- Ouvrages avant 1800 --- Philosophy of nature --- Aristotle --- Physics. --- Aristoteles; Physikē akroasis 4, 10-14. --- Philoponus, John, --- In Aristotelis Physicorum commentaria (Philoponus, John). --- Physics (Aristotle). --- Metaphysics --- Métaphysique --- Early works to 1800 --- Physics - Early works to 1800 --- Philosophy of nature - Early works to 1800 --- Aristotle. - Physics --- Philosophie. --- Aristote --- Philosophy --- Aristotle. Physics. --- Philosophy of nature.