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This paper summarizes the evidence on the evolution of transport PPPs over the last 15 years or so. In the process, it provides a primer on the associated policy issues, including of the central role of project finance in the implementation of PPP policies and the debates on risk allocation in the design of PPPs. The paper also offers a discussion of the increasingly well recognized residual roles for the public sector in transport, with an emphasis on the regulatory debates surrounding the adoption of PPPs.
Airports --- Driving --- Railways --- Toll --- Toll Roads --- Transport --- Transport Economics, Policy and Planning --- Transport Infrastructure --- Transport Infrastructures --- Transport Sector --- Urban Transport
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All interested parties seem to agree that it is important to be able to monitor public sector performance at the sectoral level, but most current work based on multi-country databases does not lend itself to country-specific conclusions. This is due to a large extent to major data limitations both on sectoral expenditures and on sectoral outcomes. This paper discusses the related issues and shows what we can do with the current data inspite of the drastic limitations. The main conclusions of the paper are that any efforts to assess country-specific performances in relative terms are likely to be difficult in view of the data problems. A rough sense of performance across sectors can be estimated for groups of countries, allowing some modest benchmarking exercises. These estimates show that low-income countries generally lag significantly behind higher-income countries. Efficiency has improved during the 1990s in energy and education but has not improved significantly in transport.
Accountability --- Allocation --- E-Business --- Expenditure levels --- Fiscal adjustment --- Government Expenditures --- Health Monitoring and Evaluation --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Labor Policies --- Private Sector Development --- Programs --- Public expenditure --- Public expenditures --- Public sector --- Public Sector Expenditure Analysis and Management --- Social Protections and Labor --- Total expenditure --- Transport --- Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
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"Estache, Perelman, and Trujillo review about 80 studies on electricity and gas, water and sanitation, and rail and ports (with a footnote on telecommunications) in developing countries. The main policy lesson is that there is a difference in the relevance of ownership for efficiency between utilities and transport in developing countries. In transport, private operators have tended to perform better than public operators. For utilities, ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country studies find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private providers. As for the country-specific studies, some do find differences in performance over time but these differences tend to matter much less than a large number of other variables. Across sectors, private operators functioning in a competitive environment or regulated under price caps or hybrid regulatory regimes tend to catch up best practice faster than public operators. There is a very strong case to push regulators in developing and transition economies toward a more systematic reliance on yardstick competition in a sector in which residual monopoly powers tend to be common. This paper--a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network--is part of a larger effort in the network to document the state of the sector"--World Bank web site.
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This paper shows empirically that "privatization" in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. The results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability, and quality of utility services.
Data --- Data Analysis --- Databases --- E-Business --- Electricity --- Emerging Markets --- Energy --- Energy Production and Transportation --- ICT Policy and Strategies --- Information --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Infrastructure Regulation --- International Telecommunications --- Mobile Phones --- Performance --- Performance Indicators --- Poverty Monitoring and Analysis --- Poverty Reduction --- Price --- Prices --- Private Sector --- Private Sector Development --- Private Sector Participation --- Prof Profits --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Public Sector Economics and Finance --- Quality of Services --- Result --- Results --- Social Accountability --- Social Development --- Technology --- Telecommunications --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation
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Twenty years ago, as the United Kingdom was getting ready to launch the privatization of its public services, Professor Littlechild developed and operationalized the concept of price caps as a regulatory regime to control for residual monopoly conditions in those services. Ten years later, Latin American countries, as they embarked into their own infrastructure reforms, also adopted the price cap regulatory model. Relying on a large data base on the factors driving contract renegotiation in the region and a survey of the literature on efficiency gains, the authors assess the impact of this regulatory regime in Latin America. They show that while the expected efficiency gains were amply achieved, these gains were seldom passed on to the users. Instead they were shared by the government and the firms. Moreover, the adoption of price caps implied higher costs of capital and hence, tariffs, and brought down levels of investment.
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This paper shows empirically that "privatization" in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. The results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability, and quality of utility services.