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We formulate a medium-scale DSGE model that emphasizes a strong interplay between a roundabout production structure and a working capital channel that requires firms to borrow funds to finance the costs of all their variable inputs and not just the wage bill. Despite an absence of backward-looking price and wage indexation, our model is able to account for (i) a persistent and hump-shaped response of inflation to a monetary policy shock, (ii) a large and persistent response of output to a monetary policy shock, (iii) a mild "price puzzle," (iv) a procyclical price markup conditional on a monetary shock, (v) non-inertial responses of inflation to non-monetary shocks, and (vi) a negative unconditional autocorrelation of the first difference of inflation that is consistent with the data. A medium-scale model relying on backward indexation of wages and prices to past inflation fails along several of these dimensions.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

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There seems to be a widespread belief among economists, policy-makers, and members of the media that the "confidence'" of households and businesses is a critical component in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks into economic activity. We take this proposition to the data using standard structural VARs with government spending and aggregate output augmented to include empirical measures of consumer or business confidence. We also estimate non-linear VAR specifications to allow for differential impacts of government spending in "normal'' times versus recessions. In normal times confidence does not react significantly to unexpected increases in government spending and spending multipliers are in the neighborhood of one; during recessions confidence rises and spending multipliers are significantly larger. We then quantify the importance of the systematic response of confidence to spending shocks for the spending multiplier and find that, in normal times, confidence is irrelevant for the transmission of government spending shocks to output, but during periods of economic slack it is important. We argue and present evidence that it is not confidence per se - in the sense of pure sentiment - that matters for the transmission of spending shocks during downturns, but rather that the composition of spending during a downtown is different. In particular, spending shocks during downturns predict future productivity improvements through a persistent increase in government investment relative to consumption, which is in turn reflected in higher measured confidence.

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We develop a structural DSGE model to systematically study the principal tools of unconventional monetary policy - quantitative easing (QE), forward guidance, and negative interest rate policy (NIRP) - as well as the interactions between them. To generate the same output response, the requisite NIRP and forward guidance interventions are twice as large as a conventional policy shock, which seems implausible in practice. In contrast, QE via an endogenous feedback rule can alleviate the constraints on conventional policy posed by the zero lower bound. Quantitatively, QE1-QE3 can account for two thirds of the observed decline in the "shadow" Federal Funds rate. In spite of its usefulness, QE does not come without cost. A large balance sheet has consequences for different normalization plans, the efficacy of NIRP, and the effective lower bound on the policy rate.

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The Federal Reserve has reacted swiftly to the COVID-19 pandemic. It has resuscitated many of its programs from the last crisis by lending to the financial sector, which we refer to as "Wall Street QE." The Fed is now proposing to also lend directly to, and purchase debt directly from, non-financial firms, which we label "Main Street QE." Our paper develops a new framework to compare and contrast these different policies. In a situation in which financial intermediary balance sheets are impaired, such as the Great Recession, Main Street and Wall Street QE are perfect substitutes and both stimulate aggregate demand. In contrast, for situations like the one we are now facing due to COVID-19, where the production sector is facing significant cash flow shortages, Wall Street QE becomes almost completely ineffective, whereas Main Street QE can be highly stimulative.

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There have recently been suggestions for monetary policy to engineer higher inflation expectations so as to stimulate current spending. But what is the empirical relationship between inflation expectations and spending? We use the underlying micro data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers to test whether increased inflation expectations are indeed associated with greater reported readiness to spend. Cross-sectional data deliver the necessary variation to test whether the relationship between inflation expectations and spending changes in the recent zero lower bound regime compared to normal times, as suggested by many standard models. We find that the impact of inflation expectations on the reported readiness to spend on durable goods is statistically insignificant and small in absolute value when compared to other variables, such as household income or expected business conditions. Moreover, it appears that higher expected price changes have an adverse impact on the reported readiness to spend. A one percent increase in expected inflation reduces the probability that households have a positive attitude towards spending by about 0.1 percentage points. At the zero lower bound this small adverse effect remains, and is, if anything, slightly stronger. We also extend our analysis to the reported readiness to spend on cars and houses and obtain similar results. Altogether our results tell a cautionary tale for monetary (or fiscal) policy designed to engineer inflation expectations in order to generate greater current spending.