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Did the U.S. government's intervention in the Chrysler reorganization overturn bankruptcy law? Critics argue that the government-sponsored reorganization impermissibly elevated claims of the auto union over those of Chrysler's other creditors. If the critics are correct, businesses might suffer an increase in their cost of debt because creditors will perceive a new risk, that organized labor might leap-frog them in bankruptcy. This paper examines the financial market where this effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. The authors find no evidence of a negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by bondholders of unionized firms. They thus reject the notion that investors perceived a distortion of bankruptcy priorities. To the contrary, bondholders of unionized firms reacted positively to the Chrysler bailout. This evidence suggests that bondholders interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a signal that the government will stand behind unionized firms. The results are consistent with the notion that too-big-to-fail government policies generate moral hazard in the credit markets.
Access to Finance --- Bankruptcies --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Bankruptcy laws --- Cost of debt --- Creditor --- Creditor claims --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Deposit Insurance --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial markets --- Government interventions --- Private Sector Development --- Reorganizations --- Risk Factors
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Did the U.S. government's intervention in the Chrysler reorganization overturn bankruptcy law? Critics argue that the government-sponsored reorganization impermissibly elevated claims of the auto union over those of Chrysler's other creditors. If the critics are correct, businesses might suffer an increase in their cost of debt because creditors will perceive a new risk, that organized labor might leap-frog them in bankruptcy. This paper examines the financial market where this effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. The authors find no evidence of a negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by bondholders of unionized firms. They thus reject the notion that investors perceived a distortion of bankruptcy priorities. To the contrary, bondholders of unionized firms reacted positively to the Chrysler bailout. This evidence suggests that bondholders interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a signal that the government will stand behind unionized firms. The results are consistent with the notion that too-big-to-fail government policies generate moral hazard in the credit markets.
Access to Finance --- Bankruptcies --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Bankruptcy laws --- Cost of debt --- Creditor --- Creditor claims --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Deposit Insurance --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial markets --- Government interventions --- Private Sector Development --- Reorganizations --- Risk Factors
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China's economic boom over the last two decades has taken many analysts by surprise, given the ongoing role of central government planning. Its current growth trajectory suggests that the size of its economy could soon surpass that of the United States. Some argue that continued growth and the expanding middle class will ultimately exert pressure on the government to bring about greater openness of the financial market. To better understand China's recent economic performance, this volume examines the distinctive system it has developed: "market socialism with Chinese characteristics." While its formal institutional makeup resembles that of a free-market economy, many of its practices remain socialist, including strategically placed state-owned enterprises that wield influence both directly and through controlled business groups, and Communist Party cells whose purpose is to maintain control of many segments of the economy. China's economic system, the contributors find, also retains many historical characteristics that play a central role in managing the economy. These and other issues are examined in chapters on China's financial regulations, corporate governance codes, bankruptcy laws, taxation, and disclosure rules.
Mixed economy --- China --- Economic conditions --- Economic policy --- china, economics, economic growth, communism, socialism, capitalism, central government planning, middle class, labor, commerce, industry, financial market, state owned business, communist party, regulations, corporate governance codes, bankruptcy laws, taxation, disclosure, mixed economy, public policy, prosperity, nation building, stock markets, securities, capital accumulation, saving rates, banking, finance, nonfiction, history.
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November 1999 - Financial reorganization under bankruptcy reduces a firm's debts to serviceable levels through negotiations overseen by courts. Academics have suggested using markets for such negotiations, giving equity holders and junior claimants call options to buy the firm back from senior creditors. Hausch and Ramachandran further develop such a market-based approach for situations in which claimants are severely cash-constrained and there is good reason for existing owner-managers to remain in control. Under the ACCORD scheme - Auction-based Creditor Ordering by Reducing Debts - creditors remain creditors but form a queue, to be serviced in sequence from the firm's operating cash flows. Creditors bid for their position in this queue. Those accepting greater proportionate reductions in the face value of their claims (perhaps most pessimistic about the firm's prospects) are placed ahead of the others. A preexisting hierarchy of claims is honored by having claimants bid for their positions within the relevant segment of the queue. No one in the queue, including owners (who are last), is paid anything until the (reduced) debts of the first in line are fully discharged. The queue then moves up and the next claimant in line is serviced. Deferred creditors, who must wait their turn for the firm's operating cash surpluses, are not junior creditors in the conventional sense. Hausch and Ramachandran determine equilibrium bidding strategies, showing that the firm's aggregate debts would be reduced to a more serviceable level. This would improve the incentives of the firm's owner-managers, who remain in control, to operate the firm efficiently. Economic resources would thus be better used, and losses already incurred would be efficiently and quickly allocated among creditors. Hausch and Ramachandran suggest that ACCORD would be appropriate for East Asia, where, despite new bankruptcy laws, inexperienced courts are unlikely to nudge creditors into a quick negotiated agreement nor to be able to cope with systemic bankruptcy. Moreover, when the government is a major unsatisfied creditor, whose agents may not act in the taxpayers' best interests, market-based solutions might remove political interference from restructuring decisions. Neither owners nor creditors would be worse off than they are now. This paper - a joint product of the Private Sector Development Department, and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to understand and improve corporate restructuring and governance. The authors may be contacted at dhausch@bus.wisc.edu or sramachandran@worldbank.org.
Aggregate Debts --- Auction --- Bankruptcy --- Bankruptcy Laws --- Bid --- Call Options --- Cash Flows --- Claimant --- Claimants --- Creditor --- Creditors --- Debt Markets --- Debts --- Deposits --- Domestic Banks --- Equity --- Face Value --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Interests --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Junior Creditors --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market --- Markets --- Strategic Debt Management
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When communism fell in 1989, the question for most Eastern European countries was not whether to go to a market economy, but how to get there. Several years later, the difficult process of privatization and restructuring continues to concern the countries of the region. The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volumes 1 and 2 is an analysis of the experiences of various countries making the transition to market economies and examines the most important challenges still in store. Volume 1, Country Studies, gives an in-depth, country-by-country analysis of various reform experiences, including historical backgrounds and discussions of policies and results to date. The countries analyzed are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, eastern Germany, Slovenia, and Russia. Written by leading economists, some of whom helped shape local and national reforms, this volume identifies common progress, common difficulties, and tentative solutions to the problems of economic transition. Volume 2, Restructuring, focuses on specific issues of transition, including how to design labor market institutions, privatization, new fiscal structures, and bankruptcy laws; how to reorganize foreign trade; and how to promote foreign direct investment. The articles, written by experts in the field, will be of direct help to those involved in the transition process. These volumes provide a standard reference on economic transition in the region for policymakers in Eastern Europe and in western countries, for international agencies concerned with the transition process, and for anyone interested in learning about the dramatic changes that have recently occurred in Eastern Europe.
Economic stabilization --- Privatization --- Congresses. --- 338 <4-11> --- 35.078 <4-11> --- #SBIB:003.IEB --- #SBIB:328H27 --- 338.24 (4-11) --- EEU / Central & Eastern Europe --- 331.31 --- 331.30 --- 330.52 --- 330.548 --- 330.540 --- Economische situatie. Economische structuur van bepaalde landen en gebieden. Economische geografie. Economische produktie.economische produkten. Economische diensten--Oost-Europa --- Vormen van overheidsbemoeing. Opheffing van overheidstussenkomst. Privatisering--Oost-Europa --- Instellingen en beleid: Midden- en Centraal Europa: algemeen --- Instrumenten van de economische politiek. Economische orde. Economisch politieke maatregelen. Stabilisering. Stimuleringsmaatregelen. Regulering. Financiele steunmaatregelen--Oost-Europa --- Economisch beleid. --- Economische toestand. --- Liberaal systeem. Neo-liberalisme. Theorie van de onderhandeling. --- Nationalisatie. Privatiseringen. --- Socialistische stelsels: algemeenheden. --- Conferences - Meetings --- 338.24 (4-11) Instrumenten van de economische politiek. Economische orde. Economisch politieke maatregelen. Stabilisering. Stimuleringsmaatregelen. Regulering. Financiele steunmaatregelen--Oost-Europa --- 35.078 <4-11> Vormen van overheidsbemoeing. Opheffing van overheidstussenkomst. Privatisering--Oost-Europa --- 338 <4-11> Economische situatie. Economische structuur van bepaalde landen en gebieden. Economische geografie. Economische produktie.economische produkten. Economische diensten--Oost-Europa --- Europe, Eastern --- Economic conditions --- Economic policy --- E-books --- Adjustment, Economic --- Business stabilization --- Economic adjustment --- Stabilization, Economic --- East Europe --- Eastern Europe --- Congresses --- Economisch beleid --- Economische toestand --- Liberaal systeem. Neo-liberalisme. Theorie van de onderhandeling --- Nationalisatie. Privatiseringen --- Socialistische stelsels: algemeenheden --- eastern europe, communism, market economy, capitalism, restructuring, privatization, reform, economics, politics, government, russia, slovenia, germany, hungary, czechoslovakia, poland, transition, foreign direct investment, trade, bankruptcy laws, fiscal structures, labor, pension, chile, treuhandanstalt, nonfiction, free markets.
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