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3 Directive No 2019/63on unfair trading practices in the business-to-business agricultural and food supply chain introduces a new set of rules to fight such “UTPs”. The Directive applies to the sale of agricultural and food products by a (weaker) supplier of a certain size up to EUR 350 million to a larger buyer of a certain size. These sizes are based on annual turnover. It includes a “black list” of practices that are prohibited in all circumstances (“per se”) in the parties’ agreements, as well as a “grey list” of practices that are prohibited, unless they are stipulated clearly and unambiguously in the parties’ agreements. It also provides for enforcement rules, such as anonymous complaints for suppliers or ex officio investigation powers for enforcement authorities. A system of coordination between those is introduced too. This paper critically analyses the Directive’s provisions, which are not free from vices. It finds that the Directive’s legal basis (art. 43(2) TFEU) may be questionable, as it also covers products that the Treaty Provision is not intended for. The personal scope of application includes six different scenarios in which the Directive applies in, based on the parties’ annual turnover. Although the Directive’s purpose is to protect weaker suppliers against stronger buyers, the personal scope leads to situations in which a certain supplier may be protected against a buyer the twofold of his size, while a different supplier will not be protected against a buyer the fourfold of his size. Not only is this discriminatory, but it acts against the Directive’s purpose. In turn, under the material scope the concept of an “Unfair Trading Practice” is insufficiently defined. It is regrettable that the Directive lacks a general clause, which would have provided a proportionate and flexible tool against UTPs. Although specific prohibitions were chosen to provide legal certainty, they cause uncertainty themselves as many of them require further interpretation. Moreover, the mere requirement to clearly and unambiguously stipulate certain practices in order to avoid their prohibition under the “grey list” may be insufficient to eliminate their unfair use, as a strong buyer can still very easily impose those clear terms on his supplier. Despite such deficiencies, an evaluation of the Directive will only happen by 1 November 2025. As an alternative and more comprehensive solution, the paper argues for a uniform approach on B2B and B2C practices at Union level. This could be achieved by an extension of the scopes of application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and Unfair Terms Directive to B2B.

Concurrence déloyale. --- Agriculture --- Aliments --- Droit européen. --- Approvisionnement --- Droit --- Trade regulation --- Competition, Unfair --- Food supply --- Food industry and trade --- Commerce --- Concurrence déloyale --- Réglementation --- Industrie et commerce

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Thesis

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The past decade has seen a growing interest in the issuance of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) by both scholars and central banks themselves. Several factors have contributed to this trend, including the digitalization of the economy, the decline in the use of cash and the appearance of stablecoins. Regarding this, CBDCs could enhance access to efficient, secure, and modern central bank money while strengthening the resilience, availability, and contestability of retail payments. In October 2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) published a report exploring the possibility of issuing a digital euro. A digital euro would be “a central bank liability offered in digital form for use by citizens and businesses for their retail payments”. The issuance of a digital euro is not aimed at substituting euro banknotes and coins. It would have legal tender status and entail cash-like benefits for digital payments. In June 2023 the European Commission launched the Digital Euro Package, comprising two regulation proposals. The Proposal for the establishment of a digital euro lays down the data protection regime to which the digital euro would be subject. Data protection has proved to be one of the most sensitive topics regarding the digital euro. CBDCs have the potential to enable central banks to oversee, track and analyse holdings and transactions carried by users. The level of privacy concerns largely depends on the architectural design chosen. The ECB could potentially have access to all the digital euro transactions made by users. This would mean that, without the appropriate safeguards, it would be able to monitor cash flow and analyse people’s payment habits, which would pose a serious concern for data protection and privacy. In the light of the problem defined above, this paper will try to answer the question of “which amendments should be proposed to the DER to ensure its compliance with EU data protection regulation, in particular with the principles contained in the GDPR and the EUDPR and the principles of necessity and proportionality?”.