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Existing theories of election-related violence often assume that if elites instigate violence, they must benefit electorally from doing so. With a focus on Kenya, this book employs a wide array of data and empirical methods to demonstrate that - contrary to conventional wisdom - violence can be a costly strategy resulting in significant voter backlash. The book argues that politicians often fail to perceive these costs and thus employ violence as an electoral tactic even when its efficacy is doubtful. Election-related violence can therefore be explained not solely by the electoral benefits it provides, but by politicians' misperceptions about its effectiveness as an electoral tactic. The book also shows that violence in founding elections - the first elections held under a new multiparty regime - has long-lasting effects on politicians (mis)perceptions about its usefulness, explaining why some countries' elections suffer from recurrent bouts of violence while others do not.

Voter intimidation --- Political violence --- Political crimes and offenses --- Presidents --- Election --- Offenses against the State --- Offenses, Political --- Political offenses --- State, Offenses against the --- Crime --- Extradition --- Subversive activities --- Violence --- Terrorism --- Elections --- Presidency --- Heads of state --- Executive power --- Corrupt practices