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Philosophy of mind --- Philosophy of mind --- History.

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Why is the human mind able to perceive and understand the truth about reality; that is, why does it seem to be the mind's specific function to know the world? Sean Kelsey argues that both the question itself and the way Aristotle answers it are key to understanding his work De Anima, a systematic philosophical account of the soul and its powers. In this original reading of a familiar but highly compressed text, Kelsey shows how this question underpins Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of soul, sensibility, and intelligence. He argues that, for Aristotle, the reason why it is in human nature to know beings is that 'the soul in a way is all beings'. This new perspective on the De Anima throws fresh and interesting light on familiar Aristotelian doctrines: for example, that sensibility is a kind of ratio (logos), or that the intellect is simple, separate, and unmixed.

Aristotle. --- Philosophy of mind

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Lorsqu'à la fin du XIXesiècle le positivisme invite les savoirs sur l'Homme à devenir scientifiques, la psychologie a hérité d'un domaine jusque-là réservé à la philosophie mais aussi aux croyances religieuses ou profanes: la compréhension de l'esprit humain et du rôle qu'il joue dans la détermination des conduites. Ce livre a pour ambition de montrer le parcours historique de cet objet avant qu'il incombe à la psychologie d'en construire la science: l'esprit (ou la conscience, ou l'entendement) a été longtemps considéré comme d'origine divine ou doté de pouvoirs surnaturels et, de ce fait, intégré à des pratiques religieuses ou magiques qui n'ont aujourd'hui pas pris fin. On constate dans ce parcours historique que les discours à son sujet et surtout les pratiques pour le convoquer ou l'interroger sont largement restées tributaires de la matrice métaphysique du spiritualisme. Alors même que la science de la nature faisait des progrès considérables pour parvenir à la thèse matérialiste de la clôture du monde physique, le spiritualisme ne s'est pas détaché du savoir de la Tradition, magique et ésotérique. La croyance dans les pouvoirs de l'esprit continue encore aujourd'hui de hanter la psychologie: des théories de l'esprit aux neurosciences cognitives, impossible d'échapper à la construction d'un ensemble de concepts que rien ne vient étayer et dans lequel on retrouve les traces du passé de l'esprit. Pourquoi, par exemple, recherche-t-on les modules de l'esprit quand rien n'en démontre l'existence? Pourquoi inconscient, interprétation des rêves, surmoi trônent-ils encore sur nos étagères thérapeutiques? Les procédures épistémologiques d'une grande partie de la psychologie tout comme le bestiaire ontologique qui la peuple témoignent des intenses réticences à en faire une science des manifestations du cerveau et, par conséquent, à en présenter une science aboutie. C'est pourtant un chemin nécessaire, auquel invite ce livre. Sommario fornito dall'editore.

Philosophy of mind.

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This book discusses the themes of personhood and personal identity. It argues that while there is a metaphysical answer to the question of personal identity, there is no metaphysical answer to the question of what constitutes a person. The author argues against both body-mind dualism and physicalism and also against the idea that there is some metaphysically real category of persons distinct from the category of human beings or human organisms. Instead, the author presents neutral-monist, autopoietic-enactivist kind of metaphysics of the human being, and a relational, and completely human-dependent notion of a person. The tools used in these arguments include conceptual argumentation and empirical case studies. Using both personal experiences and studies of cultures all over the world, the author examines dualism between mind and body. The author discusses real people who seem to live a Cartesian life, as somehow disembodied minds as well as the concept of the person. The author uses the concluding chapters to present their own views arguing that questions about our identity should be separated from questions of our personhood as well as the concept of personhood. This volume is of interest to scholars of philosophy of mind.

Psychology --- persoonlijkheidsleer --- Philosophy of mind. --- Philosophy of Mind.

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A deep concern with consciousness and intentionality is one of the several things that has lately moved into the centre of the philosophy of mind. The issue of consciousness is often treated as something distinct from intentionality, but - as Tim Crane notes in his incisive new Foreword - there is now something of a sea-change. This classic volume may be at least partly responsible for the shift in how philosophy of mind is starting to be understood. Before its first appearance, discussions of consciousness and intentionality in the context of perception were in their infancy. The book was a departure from the way this part of philosophy was conceived. It pointed to new ways to look at the discipline, addressing both the epistemology of mind, and intentionality and consciousness, especially in connection with perception. Showcasing many leading figures in the field, it offers a splendid overview of the issues at stake.

Philosophy of mind. --- Philosophy --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind