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Improving debt transparency is critical for promoting debt sustainability and creditworthiness assessments, increasing the accuracy of public debt information, and protecting the interests of a diverse range of stakeholders. The importance of debt transparency, the costs associated with the lack of it, and its benefits, are extensively discussed in recent World Bank literature. One of the key factors that limits debt transparency as it relates to public disclosure and the sharing of public debt-related information, is transaction-level confidentiality and disclosure practices. Challenges to disclosure have become more evident during recent debt distress among borrowing countries, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The discussion in this paper reveals issues that arise from confidentiality and disclosure practices among lenders and borrowers; and highlights how these issues cause information asymmetries and undermine the interests of stakeholders. The paper concludes by proposing concrete and actionable recommendations for the World Bank, IMF and sovereigns.

Debts, External.

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This paper provides an overview of the Russian Federation's default history, the legal characteristics of the bonds, and potential issues for litigation should a default materialize. The paper's main argument is that although it is not impenetrable, this Eurobond stock is more protective of the debtor than that of the usual emerging market country. It achieves this through preservation of all the defenses available under current law and the presence of broad language in key provisions. For instance, clauses providing for payment in a different currency if "reasons beyond its control" stop the debtor from paying in the denomination currency have drawn attention. The paper analyzes this and other characteristics, providing initial assessments on how the issues could play out. While the bonds' characteristics could slow progress toward obtaining judgments when compared to other sovereign debts, they do not prevent them. Collecting on the judgments would be, as usual, the harder part. Ultimately, litigation over these debts could last a long time; other creditor versus foreign sovereign episodes involving less debtor-friendly instruments have lasted 15 years, and resolution and recovery would be highly contingent on political factors. Finally, the paper provides non-lawyers a general roadmap of debt litigation against foreign sovereigns in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Debts, External.

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Debts, External --- Finance

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Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust-Guidance Note on New Enhanced Safeguards for Debt Sustainability and Capacity to Repay.

Debts, Public. --- Debts, External.

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The EU's fiscal framework needs reform. While existing fiscal rules have had some impact in constraining deficits, they did not prevent deficits and debt ratios that have threatened the stability of the monetary union in the past and that continue to create vulnerabilities today. The framework also has a poor track record at managing trade-offs between containing fiscal risks and stabilizing output. Finally, the framework does not provide sufficient tools for EU-wide stabilization. This was most visible during the decade following the euro area sovereign debt crisis, when structurally low real interest rates stretched the policy tools of the European Central Bank (ECB), leading to a persistent undershooting of its inflation target. This paper proposes a new framework based on risk-based EU-level fiscal rules, strengthened national institutions, and a central fiscal capacity. First, risk-based EU-level fiscal rules would link the speed and ambition of fiscal consolidation to the level and horizon of fiscal risks, as identified by debt sustainability analysis (DSA) using a common methodology developed by a new and independent European Fiscal Council (EFC). The 3 percent deficit and 60 percent debt reference values would remain. Second, all member countries would be required to enact medium-term fiscal frameworks consistent with the EU-level rules-that is, to ensure convergence over the medium-term to an overall fiscal balance anchor by setting expenditure ceilings. Independent national fiscal councils (NFCs) would have a much stronger role to strengthen checks and balances at the national level (including undertaking or endorsing macroeconomic projections and performing DSAs to assess fiscal risks). The European Commission (EC) would continue to play its key surveillance role as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty and the EFC would be the center of a peer network of fiscal councils. Third, building on the recent experience with the NextGenerationEU (NGEU), an EU fiscal capacity (FCEU) would improve euro area macroeconomic stabilization and allow the provision of common EU public goods-a task that has become more urgent given the green transition and common security concerns. Central to the proposal is a mutually reinforcing relationship between EU rules and national-level implementation. Strengthening implementation requires both better national ownership of the rules and their application and greater congruence of national-level frameworks with EU-level rules. The former can only be achieved by rules that convincingly balance the needs of members with the avoidance of negative externalities across members. This argues for a risk-based approach-the first pillar of our proposal. The latter requires a stronger role for significantly upgraded national level frameworks-the second pillar of our proposal.

Framing (Building) --- Debts, External.