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The EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) regime is a unilateral tool that allows certain developing countries tariff-free entry on predetermined goods into the EU market. It encompasses three programs that certain developing countries are eligible for: Everything But Arms (EBA), standard GSP and GSP+. While all schemes have different specifications countries that benefit from them are all subject to negative conditionality: if the conditions to their trade preferences are not followed the European Commission may withdraw said preferences. Negative conditionality has not been written about extensively in the literature from the perspective of the European Parliament. Therefore, this thesis explores whether the current academic conception on what triggers sanctioning calls from the EP towards beneficiaries of the GSP regime apply beyond theoretical expectations. In theory it is expected that a combination of salience, lacking economic and security interests from the EU’s side and subpar developmental performance will lead to sanctioning calls. Pakistan, a beneficiary of the GSP regime, is chosen to test the theoretical expectations on what will compel the EP to call for sanctions within the GSP regime. The country has regularly been scrutinized by MEPs over different legislative periods but never was subject to trade sanctions by the EU. Primary sources, namely interviews and documents from the EU institutions, are employed to conduct an analysis that tests the application of the three sanction-predicting criteria. Overall, this study contributes to insights on the EP’s evolving role in trade policy by holding to account perspectives that aim to predict the EP’s course of action. Summarily, the study finds that the mutually inclusive combination of salience, lacking security and economic interests and subpar development performance may be a plausible albeit not necessary condition for the EP to call for sanctions within the GSP regime. Instead, the case of Pakistan demonstrates that the EP may simply be making sure that countries that benefit from preferential trade access to the EU adhere to the conditions that underline said benefits. Essentially, the factors that motivate sanctioning requests in the EP need further exploration in the literature. By doing this the EP’s role in trade will be better understood.