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Access to microcredit has been shown to generate only modest average benefits for recipient households. We study whether other financial market frictions--in particular, lack of access to a safe place to save--might limit credit's benefits. Working with Kenyan farmers, we cross-randomize access to a simple savings product with a harvest-time loan. Among farmers offered a loan, the additional offer of a savings lockbox increased farm investment by 11% and household consumption by 7%. Results suggest that financial market frictions can interact in important ways and that multifaceted financial access programs might unlock dynamic household gains.

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In response to the Covid-19 crisis, 186 countries implemented direct cash transfers to households, and 181 introduced in-kind programs that lowered the cost of utilities such as electricity, water, transport, and mobile money. Do cash or in-kind transfers generate greater welfare improvements? And, does a country's financial infrastructure affect optimal aid disbursement? Through a parallel set of surveys in two urban regions in Africa--with comparable education, cell phone ownership, and electricity connectivity--we show that optimal government aid disbursement hinges on financial infrastructure. In line with economic theory favoring direct cash transfers, in a randomized experiment in Kenya 95% of urban recipients prefer mobile money over electricity transfers of a similar monetary value. But Kenya is an outlier with high mobile money adoption: this increases its value and reduces transaction costs of buying electricity credit. By contrast, in Ghana--where mobile money is less widespread and the transaction costs for buying electricity are higher--half of recipients prefer electricity transfers, and many are willing to forego significant value to receive electricity instead of mobile money. These results have several important policy implications. First, the optimal government policy in response to an economic crisis is not uniform: cash and in-kind transfers have different advantages that make each suitable for specific contexts. Second, the adoption of modern financial technologies will likely increase the efficiency of government cash transfer programs, even as in-kind transfers continue to be preferred in settings where mobile money uptake is slow. Finally, giving recipients a choice harnesses valuable local information that a policy maker may not have access to.