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What is the efficiency cost of rent-seeking activities in Argentina? This paper quantitatively shows that rent-seeking activities in the form of bribes have aggregate effects through two channels. First, they generate misallocation of resources across firms because they prevent resources from flowing to the most productive firms, reallocating resources instead to those that succeed at rent-seeking. Second, such activities affect the allocation of resources within firms because rent-seeking drives resources away from innovation. These two channels can help in understanding why Argentina has more misallocation across firms and less investment in research and development, compared with developed economies, explaining a sizable portion of Argentina's low productivity.

Corporate Governance and Corruption --- Enterprise Development and Reform --- Firm Performance --- Innovation --- Misallocation --- Private Sector Development --- Private Sector Economics --- Productivity --- Rent Seeking --- Science and Technology Development

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The definitive reference on the most current economics of development and institutions The essential role that institutions play in understanding economic development has long been recognized across the social sciences, including in economics. Academic and policy interest in this subject has never been higher. The Handbook of Economic Development and Institutions is the first to bring together in one single volume the most cutting-edge work in this area by the best-known international economists. The volume's editors, themselves leading scholars in the discipline, provide a comprehensive introduction, and the stellar contributors offer up-to-date analysis into institutional change and its interactions with the dynamics of economic development. This book focuses on three critical issues: the definitions of institutions in order to argue for a causal link to development, the complex interplay between formal and informal institutions, and the evolution and coevolution of institutions and their interactions with the political economy of development. Topics examined include the relationship between institutions and growth, educational systems, the role of the media, and the intersection between traditional systems of patronage and political institutions. Each chapter-covering the frontier research in its area and pointing to new areas of research-is the product of extensive workshopping on the part of the contributors. The definitive reference work on this topic, The Handbook of Economic Development and Institutions will be essential for academics, researchers, and professionals working in the field.

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