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This paper discusses Rwanda’s First Review Under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) and Monetary Policy Consultation. Rwanda’s macroeconomic performance under the program remains strong. The PCI-supported program focuses on creating budget space for the implementation of Rwanda’s National Strategy for Transformation. The program also calls for improving fiscal transparency, boosting revenue, and supporting the implementation of the new interest rate-based monetary policy framework. Looking ahead, the fiscal deficit path is forecasted to adhere to the fiscal rule under the program, which provides space for the implementation of the National Strategy for Transformation (NST) while safeguarding debt sustainability. The government plans to finance the NST partly through public borrowing, which should continue to be supported by careful debt management. There are several plans underway to increase domestic revenues by boosting the registration of new taxpayers as well as through innovative schemes and greater use of technology to strengthen tax compliance. Further progress on identifying and managing potential government liabilities—so-called fiscal risks—will be important to ensure that public resources are well protected for use on priority spending.

Fiscal policy --- Finance, Public. --- Banks --- Deflation --- Depository Institutions --- Exports and Imports --- Finance --- Financial institutions --- Fiscal risks --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants --- Industries: Financial Services --- Inflation --- International economics --- Loan guarantees --- Loans --- Macroeconomics --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Monetary economics --- Monetary policy instruments --- Monetary Policy --- Monetary policy --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Mortgages --- Price Level --- Prices --- Public Administration --- Public finance & taxation --- Public Finance --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Revenue administration --- Revenue --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Rwanda

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The COVID-19 lockdowns have brought about the need of large fiscal responses in all European countries. However, countries across Europe are differently equipped to respond to the shock due to differences in economic conditions and fiscal space. We build on the model by Berger et al. (2019) to compare gains from alternative mechanisms of EU fiscal integration in the presence of moral hazard. We show that any EU response strategy to the COVID-19 crisis excluding mutual financial support to member countries lacks credibility. Some form of fiscal risk sharing is indeed better than none, especially in presence of increasing sovereign default risk of some EU member countries. The moral hazard created by risk sharing can be hedged by introducing some form of fiscal delegation to Brussels. The desirable level of delegation, however, depends on its costs. When these are low, risk sharing and delegation are substitutes and it is optimal to opt for high delegation and low risk sharing. On the contrary, when delegation costs are high, centralization and risk sharing are complements and both are needed. Proposed arrangements at the EU level in response to the COVID-19 shock seem to reflect these basic insights by rotating around a combination of fiscal risk sharing and delegation in the form of fiscal spending conditionality.

Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Diseases: Contagious --- Structure and Scope of Government: General --- State and Local Government --- Intergovernmental Relations: General --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants --- Fiscal Policy --- Financial Crises --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Health Behavior --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Public finance & taxation --- Finance --- Infectious & contagious diseases --- Fiscal union --- Financial crises --- Public debt --- Moral hazard --- COVID-19 --- Fiscal policy --- Debts, Public --- Financial risk management --- Communicable diseases --- Italy

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Ensuring that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are efficient and managed prudently is important for economic and social reasons. It is also crucial to contain fiscal risks and reduce the burden on taxpayers from recurrent and large bailouts. Governments need to develop stronger capacity to monitor and mitigate the risks from SOEs. We present a risk tool to benchmark the performance of SOEs relative to their peers and assess their vulnerabilities, including through stress tests. A strategy to mitigate risks requires the right incentives for managers to perform and for government agencies to conduct effective oversight. Incorporating SOEs in overall fiscal targets would promote greater fiscal discipline and transparency.

Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Public Finance --- Budgeting --- Foreign Exchange --- Informal Economy --- Underground Econom --- Fiscal Policy --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants --- Public Enterprises --- Public-Private Enterprises --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Public finance & taxation --- Public ownership --- nationalization --- Budgeting & financial management --- Civil service & public sector --- Financial crises --- Economic sectors --- Public enterprises --- Fiscal risks --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Budget planning and preparation --- Contingent liabilities --- Public sector --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Fiscal policy --- Government business enterprises --- Budget --- Finance, Public --- New Zealand

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The COVID-19 crisis may lead to a series of costly and inefficient sovereign debt restructurings. Any such restructurings will likely take place during a period of great economic uncertainty, which may lead to protracted negotiations between creditors and debtors over recovery values, and potentially even relapses into default post-restructuring. State-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) could play an important role in improving the outcomes of these restructurings.

State bankruptcy. --- Asset and liability management --- Bonds --- Business and Economics --- Climate --- Communicable diseases --- Covid-19 --- Debt Management --- Debt restructuring --- Debt service --- Debt --- Debts, External --- Diseases: Contagious --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Economics: General --- Environment --- Finance --- Financial crisis --- Financial institutions --- Financial instruments --- Financial Risk Management --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Global Warming --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants --- Health Behavior --- Health --- Infectious & contagious diseases --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- Investment & securities --- Investments: Bonds --- Investments: General --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Natural Disasters and Their Management --- Natural Disasters --- Natural disasters --- Public enterprises --- Securities --- Sovereign debt defaults --- Sovereign debt restructuring --- Sovereign Debt --- Barbados

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The COVID-19 pandemic could result in large government interventions in the banking industry. To shed light on the possible consequences on market power, we rely on the experience of the global financial crisis and exploit granular data on government interventions in more than 800 banks across 27 countries between 2007 and 2017. For identification, we use a multivariate matching method. We find that intervened banks experience a significant decline in market power with respect to matched non-intervened banks. This effect is more pronounced for larger and longer interventions and is driven by a rise in costs—mostly because of higher loan impairment charges—which is not followed by a similar increase in prices.

United States --- Financial crises --- Banks and banking. --- COVID-19 (Disease) --- Government policy. --- United States. --- Banks and Banking. --- Investments: Stocks. --- Macroeconomics. --- Industries: Financial Services. --- Banks. --- Depository Institutions. --- Micro Finance Institutions. --- Mortgages. --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants. --- Market Structure and Pricing: General. --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation. --- Pension Funds. --- Non-bank Financial Institutions. --- Financial Instruments. --- Institutional Investors. --- Financial Crises. --- Finance. --- Economic & financial crises & disasters. --- Investment & securities. --- Loans. --- Bank resolution. --- Nonperforming loans. --- Stocks. --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009. --- Financial institutions. --- Crisis management. --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. --- Bank resolution --- Banks and Banking --- Banks --- Crisis management --- Depository Institutions --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- Financial Crises --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants --- Industries: Financial Services --- Institutional Investors --- Investment & securities --- Investments: Stocks --- Loans --- Macroeconomics --- Market Structure and Pricing: General --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Nonperforming loans --- Pension Funds --- Stocks