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The U.S. government employs around 2 million civilian personnel. The authority to hire and manage civilians is covered by a patchwork of human capital programs and rules that, over time, has failed to keep pace with the dynamics of a twenty-first century workforce. Federal human resources (HR) managers have complained that federal hiring procedures were rigid and complex. In an attempt to address such problems, the government has created an intricate system of demonstration projects, alternative personnel systems (APSs), and direct-hire authorities that have targeted select agencies and job types. While adding flexibility, these reforms have often resulted in multiple HR systems and greater complexity in managing federal personnel. One goal of the 2018 President's Management Agenda is to enable simple and strategic hiring practices, and the Department of Defense was tasked with examining best practices of federal demonstration projects and APSs. Toward this end, the authors identified best practices for recruiting, hiring, and compensation in 41 federal demonstration projects and APSs that began between January 2008 and May 2019. Informed by a literature review and discussions with civilian human resource professionals, the authors categorized best practices into three effectiveness groups: best, promising, and innovative. This review of program practices also revealed shortfalls in the evaluation process and implementation of these programs. The findings can inform the government's direction as it addresses the need for a talented and high-performing workforce supported by contemporary and effective human resource systems and practices.

Civil service --- Civil service reform --- Personnel management --- 2000-2099 --- United States --- United States. --- Officials and employees --- Recruiting. --- Salaries, etc.

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This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

Civil Service Reform --- Education --- Education Reform and Management --- Effective Schools and Teachers --- Field Experiment --- Incentives --- Labor Market --- Pay-For-Performance --- Performance Pay --- Primary Education --- Public Sector Development --- Teacher Recruitment --- Teacher Retention