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We examine the impact of gender equality on electoral violence in Africa using micro-level data from the sixth round of Afrobarometer surveys. The sample covers 30 countries. We find that gender equality is associated with lower electoral violence. Quantitatively, our estimates show that an increase in female-to-male labor force participation ratio by 1 percentage point is correlated with a reduction of the probability of electoral violence across the continent by around 4.2 percentage points. Our results are robust to alternative ways to measure electoral violence and gender equality, as well as to alternative specifications. The findings of this paper support the long-standing view that women empowerment contributes to the reduction of violence and underscore the urgency of addressing gender inequality in Africa.

Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Women''s Studies' --- Gender Studies --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Conflict --- Conflict Resolution --- Alliances --- Economics of Gender --- Non-labor Discrimination --- Economywide Country Studies: Africa --- Labor Standards: Labor Force Composition --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- Social discrimination & equal treatment --- Labour --- income economics --- Gender studies --- women & girls --- Gender studies, gender groups --- Gender inequality --- Labor force participation --- Women --- Gender diversity --- Income inequality --- Gender --- National accounts --- Sex discrimination --- Labor market --- Sex role --- Income distribution --- Kenya

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This paper estimates the causal effect of fiscal rules on political budget cycles in a sample of 67 developing countries over the period 1985–2007. We exploit the geographical pattern in the adoption of fiscal rules to isolate an exogenous source of variation in the adoption of national fiscal rules. Based on a diffusion argument, we use the number of other countries in a given subregion that have fiscal rules in place to predict the probability of having them at the country level. We find that in election years with fiscal rules in place, public consumption is reduced by 1.6 percentage point of GDP as compared to election years without these rules. This impact is equivalent to a reduction by a third of the volatility of public consumption in our sample. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these rules depends on their type, their institutional design, whether they have been in place for a long time and finally on the degree of competitiveness of elections.

United States --- Budgeting --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Fiscal Policy --- Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Public finance & taxation --- Budgeting & financial management --- Fiscal rules --- Expenditure --- Fiscal policy --- Budget planning and preparation --- Government asset and liability management --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Expenditures, Public --- Budget --- Finance, Public

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In this paper, we discuss whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and have real consequences through an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying and of recent empirical evidence on the subject. Overall, the findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which lessens the support for tighter rules and enforcement. This in turn allows riskier practices and worse economic outcomes. The evidence provides insights into how the rising political power of banks in the early 2000s propelled the financial system and the economy into crisis. While these findings should not be interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying, they point in the direction of a need for rethinking the framework governing interactions between regulators and banks. Enhanced transparency of regulatory decisions as well as strenghtened checks and balances within the decision-making process would go in this direction.

United States --- Banks and Banking --- Financial Risk Management --- Macroeconomics --- Industries: Financial Services --- Public Finance --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Political Economy --- Financial Crises --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Banking --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- Public finance & taxation --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Financial sector --- Deposit insurance --- Financial crises --- Economic sectors --- Financial institutions --- Expenditure --- Banks and banking --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Financial services industry --- Crisis management --- Expenditures, Public