Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper argues that oil revenue management and public investment in Congo are vulnerable to corruption as a result of limited transparency and accountability. Corruption has potentially contributed to poor macro-fiscal outcomes. The paper acknowledges the authorities’ anti-corruption efforts made so far and proposes further critical reforms to reduce remaining vulnerabilities. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model results show that, depending on the reforms adopted, the potential additional growth can range between 0.8 to 1.8 percent per year over the next 10 years, and debt can decline by 2.25 to 3 percent of GDP per year over the same period. These results suggest that macrofiscal gains from anti-corruption reforms could be substantial even under conservative reform scenarios.

Corporations --- Corporate bribery --- Corporate corruption --- Corporate crime --- Business ethics --- Commercial crimes --- Corrupt practices. --- Investments: Energy --- Public Finance --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development --- Hydrocarbon Resources --- Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures --- Other Public Investment and Capital Stock --- Energy: General --- Business Taxes and Subsidies --- Public finance & taxation --- Investment & securities --- white-collar crime --- Oil --- Public investment spending --- Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) --- Oil, gas and mining taxes --- Commodities --- Crime --- Expenditure --- Taxes --- Petroleum industry and trade --- Public investments --- Public-private sector cooperation --- Congo, Democratic Republic of the --- White-collar crime