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Documentation and information --- Mass communications --- Information systems --- Archivistics
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Many countries provide financial incentives to spur innovation, ranging from tax incentives to research and development grants. In this paper, we study how such financial incentives affect individuals' decisions to pursue careers in innovation. We first present empirical evidence on inventors' career trajectories and income distributions using de-identified data on 1.2 million inventors from patent records linked to tax records in the U.S. We find that the private returns to innovation are extremely skewed - with the top 1% of inventors collecting more than 22% of total inventors' income - and are highly correlated with their social impact, as measured by citations. Inventors tend to have their most impactful innovations around age 40 and their incomes rise rapidly just before they have high-impact patents. We then build a stylized model of inventor career choice that matches these facts as well as recent evidence that childhood exposure to innovation plays a critical role in determining whether individuals become inventors. The model predicts that financial incentives, such as top income tax reductions, have limited potential to increase aggregate innovation because they only affect individuals who are exposed to innovation and have no impact on the decisions of star inventors, who matter most for aggregate innovation. Importantly, these results hold regardless of whether the private returns to innovation are known at the time of career choice. In contrast, increasing exposure to innovation (e.g., through mentorship programs) could have substantial impacts on innovation by drawing individuals who produce high-impact inventions into the innovation pipeline. Although we do not present direct evidence supporting these model-based predictions, our results call for a more careful assessment of the impacts of financial incentives and a greater focus on alternative policies to increase the supply of inventors.
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The academic literature literally contains hundreds of variables that seem to predict the cross-section of expected returns. This so-called "anomaly zoo" has caused many to question whether researchers are using the right tests of statistical significance. But, here's the thing: even if researchers use the right tests, they will still draw the wrong conclusions from their econometric analyses if they start out with the wrong priors---i.e., if they start out with incorrect beliefs about the ex ante probability of encountering a tradable anomaly. So, what are the right priors? What is the correct anomaly base rate? We develop a first way to estimate the anomaly base rate by combining two key insights: 1) Empirical-Bayes methods capture the implicit process by which researchers form priors based on their past experience with other variables in the anomaly zoo. 2) Under certain conditions, there is a one-to-one mapping between these prior beliefs and the best-fit tuning parameter in a penalized regression. We study trading-strategy performance to verify our estimation results. If you trade on two variables with similar one-month-ahead return forecasts in different anomaly-base-rate regimes (low vs. high), the variable in the low base-rate regime consistently underperforms the otherwise identical variable in the high base-rate regime.
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Many countries provide financial incentives to spur innovation, ranging from tax incentives to research and development grants. In this paper, we study how such financial incentives affect individuals' decisions to pursue careers in innovation. We first present empirical evidence on inventors' career trajectories and income distributions using de-identified data on 1.2 million inventors from patent records linked to tax records in the U.S. We find that the private returns to innovation are extremely skewed - with the top 1% of inventors collecting more than 22% of total inventors' income - and are highly correlated with their social impact, as measured by citations. Inventors tend to have their most impactful innovations around age 40 and their incomes rise rapidly just before they have high-impact patents. We then build a stylized model of inventor career choice that matches these facts as well as recent evidence that childhood exposure to innovation plays a critical role in determining whether individuals become inventors. The model predicts that financial incentives, such as top income tax reductions, have limited potential to increase aggregate innovation because they only affect individuals who are exposed to innovation and have no impact on the decisions of star inventors, who matter most for aggregate innovation. Importantly, these results hold regardless of whether the private returns to innovation are known at the time of career choice. In contrast, increasing exposure to innovation (e.g., through mentorship programs) could have substantial impacts on innovation by drawing individuals who produce high-impact inventions into the innovation pipeline. Although we do not present direct evidence supporting these model-based predictions, our results call for a more careful assessment of the impacts of financial incentives and a greater focus on alternative policies to increase the supply of inventors.
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