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"Armed conflict has declined in both frequency and intensity since the end of the Cold War. The trends are especially clear for interstate conflict, but they also hold true for intrastate conflict. Taking into account historical trends and projections of key conflict drivers, the interstate and intrastate baseline future conflict projections in this report depict a continued decline through 2040, with interstate conflict down to extremely low levels and a much lower incidence of intrastate conflict. Some divergence from these projections is likely. The three factors that most strongly increased interstate conflict expectations were declining U.S. preeminence, declining capabilities of international organizations, and declining prevalence of consolidated democracies. The incidence of intrastate conflict is expected to increase if the capacity of state institutions or the rate of economic growth declines. Although the authors' projections indicate that interstate conflict may be rare in the future, the United States must retain a ready and credible land power deterrent to ensure such a future. Such a deterrent might not be used frequently, but its very existence delays the rise of a challenger and has a dampening effect on the incidence of conflict. The authors' projections also indicate that intrastate conflict (including proxy wars) will continue to be the main form of conflict incidence and, given the U.S. position in the international state system, Army forces are likely to become engaged in such conflicts. The trends toward a decrease in conflict incidence do not necessarily mean fewer U.S. interventions"--Publisher's web site
War --- Guerre --- History --- Research. --- Forecasting. --- Histoire --- Recherche. --- Prévision. --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- Operational readiness. --- État de préparation opérationnelle. --- United States --- Military policy.
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The position of inventoried stock within the U.S. Army's logistical network is inseparably linked to operational success. The ability of the Army to deliver materiel as needed on a timely basis to support training and maintain readiness can ultimately decide mission outcome. In short, should the Army be able to improve delivery of materiel, it will improve its overall performance. This report focuses on how the Army could improve its distribution of heavy secondary items, such as wheel assemblies, that account for a small proportion of the overall number of items the Army must ship to users but comprise a large proportion of the weight it ships. It discusses how the Army could leverage the scheduled-truck network of Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) distribution hubs to decrease average customer wait time by two to four days, for this class of items. The Army could also save nearly $1 million monthly in shipping costs, through reduced use of truckload and less-than-truckload shipping. It also discusses how changes in source-preference logic in logistics-management programs could ensure those outside the DLA-hub network receive materiel from the most appropriate source. The research concludes that Army Materiel Command has several opportunities to direct where inventory is located, including when items are newly procured, when they come out of maintenance, and when source-preference programing is devised. Altogether, balancing inventory against regional demand would help item managers reduce requisition wait time and save costs.
Logistics --- Materials management. --- Logistique --- Gestion de l'approvisionnement. --- Management. --- Gestion. --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- Supplies and stores. --- Operational readiness. --- État de préparation opérationnelle.
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"The 2014 Army Posture Statement considered two future Army end strengths: one that includes an active component (AC) of 450,000, as part of a Total Army of 980,000 (980K), and one that includes an AC of 420,000, as part of a Total Army of 920,000 (920K). These force sizes call into question the Army's ability to "regenerate" itself to higher strength levels in a timely way should the nation require it to do so. This analysis modeled the Army's ability to increase its AC end strength over a five-year period -- starting from a Total Army of 980K and starting from a Total Army of 920K -- so that the Army could provide the number of deployable troops available at the end of the last conflict in 2010 (what we term a "550K" AC). The analysis indicated that the policies the Army and the Department of Defense currently have at their disposal are likely adequate to expand the force to provide the capacity associated with a 550K AC, starting with either the 980K or 920K Total Army. The analyses did not uncover any constraints that would make such regeneration infeasible but did suggest a number of risks, particularly when expanding from a Total Army of 920K. Potentially the most critical risk revolves around the fact that the Army as a whole will still need to meet operational demands even as the AC is expanding. Thus, the Army would have to draw on its reserve components (RC) to an unprecedented extent to sustain high levels of operational commitment until it accomplishes regeneration."--Publisher's description.
Manpower --- Manpower planning --- Main-d'œuvre --- Armed Forces --- Forces armées --- Planification --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- Operational readiness --- Planning. --- Forecasting. --- Recruiting, enlistment, etc. --- Operational readiness. --- Personnel management --- Evaluation. --- État de préparation opérationnelle --- Planification. --- Prévision.
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