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In his last book, Towards a Relational Ontology, Andrew Benjamin provided a philosophical account of what he terms anoriginal relationality, demonstrating how this concept can be seen to be at work throughout the history of philosophy. In Virtue in Being, he builds on that project to argue for a new way of understanding the relationship between ontology and ethics through insightful readings of texts by Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Jacques Derrida. Structuring the book around the themes of violence, evil, and pardon, Benjamin builds a convincing case for the connections he draws between thinkers not commonly associated with one another.

Ethics. --- Philosophical anthropology. --- Anthropology, Philosophical --- Man (Philosophy) --- Civilization --- Life --- Ontology --- Humanism --- Persons --- Philosophy of mind --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Philosophy --- Values

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A Natural History of Human Morality offers the most detailed account to date of the evolution of human moral psychology. Based on extensive experimental data comparing great apes and human children, Michael Tomasello reconstructs how early humans gradually became an ultra-cooperative and, eventually, a moral species. There were two key evolutionary steps, each founded on a new way that individuals could act together as a plural agent "we". The first step occurred as ecological challenges forced early humans to forage together collaboratively or die. To coordinate these collaborative activities, humans evolved cognitive skills of joint intentionality, ensuring that both partners knew together the normative standards governing each role. To reduce risk, individuals could make an explicit joint commitment that "we" forage together and share the spoils together as equally deserving partners, based on shared senses of trust, respect, and responsibility. The second step occurred as human populations grew and the division of labor became more complex. Distinct cultural groups emerged that demanded from members loyalty, conformity, and cultural identity. In becoming members of a new cultural "we", modern humans evolved cognitive skills of collective intentionality, resulting in culturally created and objectified norms of right and wrong that everyone in the group saw as legitimate morals for anyone who would be one of "us". As a result of this two-stage process, contemporary humans possess both a second-personal morality for face-to-face engagement with individuals and a group-minded "objective" morality that obliges them to the moral community as a whole.

Ethics --- Ethics, Evolutionary. --- Philosophical anthropology. --- Civilization --- Life --- Ontology --- Humanism --- Persons --- Philosophy of mind --- Anthropology, Philosophical --- Man (Philosophy) --- Ethical relativism --- Ethics, Naturalistic --- Evolutionary ethics --- Naturalistic ethics --- History. --- Philosophy --- Ethics, Evolutionary --- Philosophical anthropology

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This book compares two competing theories of human nature: the more traditional theory espoused in different forms by centuries of western philosophy and the newer, Darwinian model.  In the traditional view, the human being is a hybrid being, with a lower, animal nature and a higher, rational or “spiritual” component. The competing Darwinian account does away with the idea of a higher nature and attempts to provide a complete reduction of human nature to the evolutionary goals of survival and reproduction.  Whitley Kaufman presents the case that the traditional conception, regardless of one's religious views or other beliefs, provides a superior account of human nature and culture. We are animals, but we are also rational animals.  Kaufman explores the most fundamental philosophical questions as they relate to this debate over human nature—for example: Is free will an illusion? Is morality a product of evolution, with no objective basis?  Is reason merely a tool for promoting reproductive success?  Is art an adaptation for attracting mates? Is there any higher meaning or purpose to human life? Human Nature and the Limits of Darwinism aims to assess the competing views of human nature and present a clear account of the issues on this most pressing of questions.  It engages in a close analysis of the numerous recent attempts to explain all human aims in terms of Darwinian processes and presents the arguments in support of the traditional conception of human nature.   .

Philosophy, modern. --- Evolution (Biology) --- Philosophical anthropology. --- Philosophy. --- Anthropology, Philosophical --- Man (Philosophy) --- Civilization --- Life --- Ontology --- Humanism --- Persons --- Philosophy of mind --- Philosophy --- Ontology. --- Movement (Philosophy). --- Philosophy of Man. --- Philosophical Traditions. --- Modern Philosophy. --- Modern philosophy --- Being --- Metaphysics --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Substance (Philosophy) --- Mental philosophy --- Humanities --- Modern philosophy.

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Philosophical anthropology --- Arendt, Hannah --- Anthropologie philosophique --- Anthropology [Philosophical ] --- Antropologie [Filosofische ] --- Antropologie [Wijsgerige ] --- Filosofie van de mensheid --- Filosofische antropologie --- Homme (Philosophie) --- Homme -- Philosophie --- Homme [Philosophie de l' ] --- Man (Philosophy) --- Mens (Filosofie) --- Menselijke natuur (Filosofie) --- Nature humaine (Philosophie) --- Natuur [Menselijke ] (Filosofie) --- Philosophie de l'homme --- Wijsgerige antropologie --- Travail --- Philosophie --- Comportement humain --- Arendt, Hannah (1906-1975) --- Arendt, Hannah, --- Human behavior --- Sociology --- Work --- Sociologie --- Philosophy. --- Human condition (Arendt, Hannah) --- Philosophy --- Philosophie. --- Comportement humain.

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While the central ideal of Roman philosophy exemplified by Lucretius, Cicero and Seneca appears to be the masculine values of self-sufficiency and domination, this book argues, through close attention to metaphor and figures, that the Romans also recognized, as constitutive parts of human experience, what for them were feminine concepts such as embodiment, vulnerability and dependency. Expressed especially in the personification of grammatically feminine nouns such as Nature and Philosophy 'herself', the Roman's recognition of this private 'feminine' part of himself presents a contrast with his acknowledged, public self and challenges the common philosophical narrative of the emergence of subjectivity and individuality with modernity. To meet this challenge, Alex Dressler offers both theoretical exposition and case studies, developing robust typologies of personification and personhood that will be useable for a variety of subjects beyond classics, including rhetoric, comparative literature, gender studies, political theory and the history of ideas.

Subjectivity. --- Philosophical anthropology. --- Human beings. --- Feminism. --- Philosophy, Ancient. --- Ancient philosophy --- Greek philosophy --- Philosophy, Greek --- Philosophy, Roman --- Roman philosophy --- Emancipation of women --- Feminist movement --- Women --- Women's lib --- Women's liberation --- Women's liberation movement --- Women's movement --- Social movements --- Anti-feminism --- Homo sapiens --- Human race --- Humanity (Human beings) --- Humankind --- Humans --- Man --- Mankind --- People --- Hominids --- Persons --- Anthropology, Philosophical --- Man (Philosophy) --- Civilization --- Life --- Ontology --- Humanism --- Philosophy of mind --- Subjectivism --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Relativity --- Emancipation --- Philosophy