Search
Feedback
About UniCat 
Help
News
| Listing 1 - 2 of 2 |
Sort by
|
Digital
Year: 2015 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
We formulate a dynamic financial contracting problem with risky inalienable human capital. We show that the inalienability of the entrepreneur's risky human capital not only gives rise to endogenous liquidity limits but also calls for dynamic liquidity and risk management policies via standard securities that firms routinely pursue in practice, such as retained earnings, possible line of credit draw-downs, and hedging via futures and insurance contracts.
Book
Year: 2015 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
A risk-averse entrepreneur with access to a profitable venture needs to raise funds from investors. She cannot indefinitely commit her human capital to the venture, which limits the firm's debt capacity, distorts investment and compensation, and constrains the entrepreneur's risk-sharing. This puts dynamic liquidity and state-contingent risk allocation at the center of corporate financial management. The firm balances mean-variance investment efficiency and the preservation of financial slack. We show that in general the entrepreneur's net worth is overexposed to idiosyncratic risk and underexposed to systematic risk. These distortions are greater the closer the firm is to exhausting its debt capacity.
| Listing 1 - 2 of 2 |
Sort by
|