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We analyze a model of optimal capital structure and liquidity choice based on a dynamic tradeoff theory for financially constrained firms. In addition to the classical tradeoff between the expected tax advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs, we introduce a cost of external financing for the firm, which generates a precautionary demand for liquidity and an optimal liquidity management policy for the firm. An important new cost of debt financing in this context is an endogenous debt servicing cost: debt payments drain the firm's valuable liquidity reserves and thus impose higher expected external financing costs on the firm. The precautionary demand for liquidity also means that realized earnings are separated in time from payouts to shareholders, implying that the classical Miller-formula for the net tax benefits of debt no longer holds. Our model offers a novel perspective for the "debt conservatism puzzle" by showing that financially constrained firms choose to limit debt usages in order to preserve their liquidity. In some cases, they may not even exhaust their risk-free debt capacity.
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We develop a model of investment timing under uncertainty for a financially constrained firm. Facing external financing costs, the firm prefers to fund its investment through internal funds, so that the firm's optimal investment policy and value depend on both its earnings fundamentals and liquidity holdings. We show that financial constraints significantly alter the standard real options results, with the financial flexibility conferred by internal funds acting as a complement, and at times as a substitute, to the real flexibility given by the optimal timing of investment. We show that: 1) the investment hurdle is highly nonlinear and non-monotonic in the firm's internal funds; 2) in contrast to predictions implied by standard corporate savings models, a financially constrained firm may behave in a risk seeking sense (and thus firm value may be convex in liquidity) due to the interaction between financial and real (growth/abandonment) flexibility; 3) with multiple rounds of growth options, a value-maximizing financially constrained firm may choose to over-invest via accelerated investment timing in earlier stages in order to mitigate under-investment problems in later stages.
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We develop an integrated theory of investment, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), liquidation, and corporate savings under uncertainty for a financially constrained firm, which features endogenous growth options, abandonment options, and payout policies. Facing costly external financing, the firm prefers to fund its investment internally, so that its optimal policies and value depend on both its earnings fundamentals and liquidity holdings. The firm values not only real flexibility but also financial flexibility. The interaction of real and financial flexibility generates novel real options results: (1) Limited financial slack significantly erodes the value of growth & abandonment options; (2) Firms prefer projects with front-loaded cash-flows; (3) The firm's incentive to forgo costly external financing and to accumulate internal funds may cause substantial delay in investment; (4) A financially constrained firm over-invests in early stages of its life-cycle in an effort to quickly build up its cash-flow generating capacity; (5) SEOs are driven by both firm survival and growth motives. A firm in the mature phase may find itself in three mutually exclusive regions: payout, inaction, and liquidation. A firm in its growth phase may find itself in two additional regions: a region where investment is partly financed with an SEO and a region where investment is solely financed with internal funds. These regions depend on both firm savings and earnings fundamentals.
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We analyze a model of optimal capital structure and liquidity choice based on a dynamic tradeoff theory for financially constrained firms. In addition to the classical tradeoff between the expected tax advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs, we introduce a cost of external financing for the firm, which generates a precautionary demand for liquidity and an optimal liquidity management policy for the firm. An important new cost of debt financing in this context is an endogenous debt servicing cost: debt payments drain the firm's valuable liquidity reserves and thus impose higher expected external financing costs on the firm. The precautionary demand for liquidity also means that realized earnings are separated in time from payouts to shareholders, implying that the classical Miller-formula for the net tax benefits of debt no longer holds. Our model offers a novel perspective for the "debt conservatism puzzle" by showing that financially constrained firms choose to limit debt usages in order to preserve their liquidity. In some cases, they may not even exhaust their risk-free debt capacity.
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