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The problem of free will is one of the great perennial issues of philosophy and has been discussed and debated over many centuries. The issues that arise in this sphere cover both metaphysics and morals and concern matters of central importance not only for philosophy but also for law, theology, psychology and the social sciences. What is at stake here is nothing less than our self-image as responsible moral agents who are in control of our own destiny and fate. The investigations and findings of modern science are judged by many to put skeptical pressure on this self-image and may challenge its credibility. During the past few decades the free will controversy has developed and evolved in exciting and significant ways. All the major parties involved in this debate have had to revise and amend their core positions with a view to responding to the sophisticated and searching arguments put forward by their critics and opponents. The papers collected in this volume represent the most essential and indispensible contributions to the contemporary debate. The specific topics covered include: moral luck, skepticism and naturalism, the consequence argument, alternate possibilities, libertarian metaphysics, compatibilism and reason-responsive theories, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, and the phenomenology of agency, as well as contributions relating to neuroscience and experimental philosophy. The collection is arranged in a way that presents the topics covered in a structured and organized manner. The general aim is to provide an effective guide for students and readers who are new to the field, as well as a useful collection for those who are already familiar with the topics and contributions. The contributors include many of the leading and most distinguished figures in the field, along with a number of younger scholars who have already had an impact and produced significant work.

Free will and determinism. --- Free will and determinism --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy)

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Common sense tells us that we are morally responsible for our actions only if we have free will -- and that we have free will only if we are able to choose among alternative actions. Common sense tells us that we do have free will and are morally responsible for many of the things we do. Common sense also tells us that we are objects in the natural world, governed by its laws. Nevertheless, many contemporary philosophers deny that we have free will or that free will is a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility. Some hold that we are morally responsible only if we are somehow exempt from the laws of nature. Causes, Laws, and Free Will defends a thesis that has almost disappeared from the contemporary philosophical landscape by arguing that this philosophical flight from common sense is a mistake. We have free will even if everything we do is predictable given the laws of nature and the past, and we are morally responsible whatever the laws of nature turn out to be. The impulses that tempt us into thinking that determinism robs us of free will spring from mistakes -- mistakes about the metaphysics of causation, mistakes about the nature of laws, and mistakes about the logic of counterfactuals.

Free will and determinism --- Agent (Philosophy) --- Act (Philosophy) --- Choice (Psychology) --- Free will and determinism. --- Act (Philosophy). --- Agent (Philosophy). --- Choice (Psychology). --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Psychology --- Agency (Philosophy) --- Agents --- Person (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Action (Philosophy)

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Kriminalstrafe ohne Schuldvorwurf ein Pla ̈doyer fu ̈r A ̈nderungen in der strafrechtlichen Verbrechenslehre ; [Vortrag gehalten am 27. Juni 2012]

Guilt (Law) --- Free will and determinism. --- Criminal liability. --- Accountability, Criminal --- Criminal accountability --- Criminal liability --- Criminal responsibility --- Liability, Criminal --- Responsibility, Criminal --- Liability (Law) --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Criminal law --- Law and legislation --- Strafrecht --- Strafrecht: Grundlagen --- allgemein

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This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will-at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness.

Philosophical anthropology --- Theory of knowledge --- Free will and determinism. --- Consciousness. --- Phenomenology. --- Philosophy, Modern --- Apperception --- Mind and body --- Perception --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Spirit --- Self --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy)

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The issues of mental causation, consciousness, and free will have vexed philosophers since Plato. In this book, Peter Tse examines these unresolved issues from a neuroscientific perspective.

Cognitive neuroscience. --- Free will and determinism. --- Neuropsychology. --- Science -- Philosophy. --- Cognitive neuroscience --- Neuropsychology --- Science --- Free will and determinism --- Behavioral Sciences --- Psychological Phenomena and Processes --- Mind-Body Therapies --- Physiology --- Psychiatry and Psychology --- Behavioral Disciplines and Activities --- Complementary Therapies --- Biological Science Disciplines --- Therapeutics --- Natural Science Disciplines --- Disciplines and Occupations --- Analytical, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques and Equipment --- Psychophysiology --- Volition --- Mental Processes --- Human Anatomy & Physiology --- Health & Biological Sciences --- Neuroscience --- Philosophy --- Philosophy. --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Normal science --- Philosophy of science --- Cognitive neuropsychology --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Neurophysiology --- Cognitive science --- NEUROSCIENCE/General --- PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General