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Unter Modalität sind verschiedene Kategorien zusammengefasst: Modalverben, Modalpartikel, Vergewisserungsfragen. Die Gemeinsamkeit der grundmodalen und epistemischen sowie evidentialen Lesarten von Modalverben einerseits und Modalpartikeln andererseits ist das Thema dieses Bandes. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, welche Gewissheitsgrade für den Hörer diese Wortarten vermitteln, wieweit dabei Verhandlungsstrategien vom Sprecher gegenüber dem Hörer eingesetzt werden und wieso solche Wortarten nicht in allen Sprachen in gleicher Weise lexikalisch oder grammatisch vertreten sind. Da Modalität im Deutschen weit overter kodiert wird als in den meisten nichtgermanischen Sprachen, eignet sich die Untersuchung der Funktion von Modalität im Deutschen besonders gut zur Ermittlung eines funktionalen Nenners von Modalität, der sich als Leitfaden zur Ermittlung von bislang nicht wahrgenommenen kovert kodierten Modalitätsphänomenen in anderen Sprachen nutzen lässt. Auf diese Weise lässt sich zunehmend ein Verständnis der komplexesten und am wenigsten verstandenen grammatischen Kategorien der menschlichen Sprache ermitteln.

Modality (Linguistics) --- Grammar, Comparative and general. --- Modal Particles. --- Modal Verbs. --- Theory of Mind.

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Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today's canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind. Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut-one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in "thick" descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices. Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.

Philosophy of mind. --- Cognitive science. --- Science --- Philosophy of mind --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Philosophy --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology

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Thinking is overrated: golfers perform best when distracted and under pressure; firefighters make the right calls without a clue as to why; and you are yourself ill advised to look at your steps as you go down the stairs, or to try and remember your pin number before typing it in. Just do it, mindlessly. Both empirical psychologists and the common man have long worked out that thinking is often a bad idea, but philosophers still hang on to an intellectualist picture of human action. This book...

Philosophy of mind. --- Thought and thinking --- Mind --- Thinking --- Thoughts --- Educational psychology --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Intellect --- Logic --- Perception --- Psycholinguistics --- Self --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Philosophy.

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This volume offers a new understanding of Titchener’s influential system of psychology popularly known as introspectionism, structuralism and as classical introspective psychology. Adopting a new perspective on introspectionism and seeking to assess the reasons behind its famous implosion, this book reopens and rewrites the chapter in the history of early scientific psychology pertaining to the nature of E. B. Titchener’s psychological system.   Arguing against the view that Titchener’s system was undone by an overreliance on introspection, the author explains how this idea was first introduced by the early behaviorists in order to advance their own theoretical agenda. Instead, the author argues that the major philosophical flaw of introspectionism was its utter reliance on key theoretical assumptions inherited from the intellectual tradition of British associationism—assumptions that were upheld in defiance of introspection, not because of introspection.   The book is divided into three parts. In Part I, British associationism is examined thoroughly. The author here discusses the psychology of influential empiricist philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, David Hartley, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill. In Part II of the book, Titchener’s introspectionist system of psychology is examined and analyzed. In Part III, the author argues that Titchener’s psychology should be understood as a form of associationism and explains how analysis, not introspection, was central to introspectionism. .

Philosophy & Religion --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- History. --- Philosophy. --- Titchener, Edward Bradford, --- Tʻieh-chin-na, Ai-tê-hua, --- Titchener, E. B. --- Philosophy of mind. --- Psychology. --- Philosophy of Mind. --- History of Psychology. --- History of Philosophy. --- Philosophy (General). --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Mental philosophy --- Humanities --- Behavioral sciences --- Mind --- Science, Mental --- Human biology --- Soul --- Mental health --- Social sciences

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Although Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) is commonly known for his spiritual philosophy, his early career was focused on natural science. During this period, Swedenborg thought the world was like a gigantic machine, following the laws of mechanics and geometry. This volume analyses this mechanistic world-view from the cognitive perspective, by means of a study of the metaphors in Swedenborg’s texts. The author argues that these conceptual metaphors are vital skills of the creative mind and scientific thinking, used to create visual analogies and abstract ideas. This means that Swedenborg’s mechanistic and geometrical world-view allowed him to perceive the world as mechanical and geometrical. Swedenborg thought "with" books and pens. The reading gave him associations and clues, forced him to interpret, and gave him material for his intellectual development.

Causation. --- Determinism (Philosophy). --- Science -- Philosophy. --- Philosophy & Religion --- Philosophy --- Philosophy of mind. --- Swedenborg, Emanuel, --- Swedberg, Emanuel --- Philosophy. --- History. --- History of Philosophy. --- History of Science. --- Philosophy of Mind. --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Philosophy (General). --- Annals --- Auxiliary sciences of history --- Mental philosophy --- Humanities --- Science