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This Masters thesis addresses the problem of the coherence of Henri Bergson's concept of image in his work Matière et mémoire (1896). The problem of the concept of image's coherence is difficult in light of two peculiar characteristics that belong to the concept. First, the concept of image possesses a plurality of meanings due to manner in which Bergson elaborates it: he initially develops an imprecise conception of image that he repeatedly modifies in the context of different philosophical problems over the course of his work. Second, the concept of image does not merely function as ordinary conceptual element of Matière et mémoire; on the contrary, it operates on at least four major orders within Bergson's philosphical system. In particular, it functions as a conceptual plane for diverse philosophcial problems, an ordinary conceptual element, a figurative device, and an anchor for the disconnected segements of Bergson's system.While the problem of the coherence of Bergson's concept of image is complicated, it is nevertheless of critical importance. The problem's importance is due to the fact that the possibility of the soundness of philosophical system articulated in Matière et mémoire hangs on it. Because the concept of image anchors the disconnected sections of Matière et mémoire, if the concept's meanings do not cohere, neither will Bergson's philosophical system. Conversely, if in some way the meaning of the concept does prove coherent, its coherence will retain the possibility of the soundness of Bergson's system.The concept of image's plurality of meanings and orders on which it operates would suggest that the concept will most likely prove incoherent. However, I maintain that Bergson's concept of image does, in fact, cohere. Drawing on Bergson's brief excursus on the task of philosophy as well as his intimate familiary with the principles of infinitesmial calculus, I propose that we can think of the concept's disjointed meanings as a di

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I started this thesis to explore whether Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy expected too much of Wagner when he made him the next composer of tragedy. Richard Wagners opera Tristan und Isolde is what Nietzsche believes to be the rebirth of tragedy. Nietzsche uses Wagner in comparison to the ancient Greeks whose Attic tragedy was the original formation of tragedy. This investigation considered the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and what sort of structure makes the tragic art form that is music drama. Tragedy is what reveals the human condition to mankind, yet simultaneously shields him from the full effect of the devastation of that realisation. The effect of this is that man is consoled about life and can live on. Nietzsche theorises about two art drives that are symbolised by the Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus. The Apollonian art drive represents language and the Dionysian art drive represents music. These two drives combine together to create tragedy. However the conditions for this synthesis are not easy to procure as these two drives clash against each other in disagreement. As seen by Nietzsches examples of the Greeks, there is an element that can destroy tragedy. This is Socrates. Socrates has the power to undermine the Dionysian drive. Once this has happens Greek tragedy is dead. Wagner rescues tragedy by recreating it as opera and he is Nietzsches genius artist by constituting the rebirth of tragedy. My aim was to derive what makes tragedy and how the Apollonian and Dionysian art drives combine to make the tragic art form. I did this by exploring the effects of the art drives and what their representative arts are. Once this was done I decided to inspect the Socratic element which is introduced to music drama through Euripides. This destroys the Dionysian element of tragedy and also dissolves the Apollonian … so there is no possibility of the tragic art form existing. I also deduced what sort of artist is capable of creating tragedy. After th

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Husserls account of evidence has undergone several refinements throughout his work. This paper investigates the evolution of Husserls concept of necessary, apodictic evidence, pertaining to the sphere of pure essences, in connection to his notion of adequacy of giveness. Husserls early account of evidence displays a close connection between adequacy and apodicticity, and several authors have argued that Husserl uses the two interchangeably. This account is analyzed under the light of two main lines of criticism which appear to pull the apodictic … adequate relation in two different directions: either as infecting the apodictic with contingency, or as throwing the shadow of intellectualism on Husserls account of constitution.I argue that the main fault of Husserls early account, which opened him to the first line of criticism, was the lack of an explicit method aimed at securing access into the realm of pure essences. Further on, in what the second line of criticism is concerned, I argue that Husserls notion of evidence is rather dynamically constituted, and not the result of a mere passive-representational endeavour, as implied by the accusation with intellectualism. Husserls middle account of evidence in Ideen I is shown to work on these points of confusion. Now, Husserl refines his theory of knowledge and develops his method of eidetic variation as a mechanism ensuring access to essences.While in his early works the apodicticity of evidence still went hand in hand with its value-charged adequacy, in the Cartesian Meditations Husserl abandons this view and argues that apodictic evidence need not necessarily be adequate. This split opens Husserls account of evidence to further criticism. David Levin (1970) argues that eidetic variation can be seen only as a more elaborate form of induction, and thus by claiming strong apodicticity with regard to pure essences, Husserl bounces back into rationalism. I argue with late Husserl that apodicticity, pro

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While certain figures have maintained that phenomenology cannot think the novelty of the event, I seek to make plain how, in the work of German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, novelty lies at the very origin of all appearing. As a result, I maintain that there can be no openness to phenomenality, to the perception of time, unless there is an openness to novelty. To show how this is the case, I begin by outlining how, in Husserl, objective time, which is the time of the clock, is constituted in the immanent time of consciousness. I continue by showing how these two levels of time are themselves necessarily constituted in what Husserl refers to as absolute time-constituting consciousness. I then address what has traditionally been viewed as Husserl's neglect of the role of the future in time-constituting consciousness. Against a recent movement that seeks to outline the directedness toward the future (i.e. protention) as standing apart from the retention of the past, I argue that, in Husserl, the retention of the past and the directedness toward the future must necessarily be thought together as a striving toward what affects it. This relation between affection and striving is then explored further, as I seek to advance the position that affection, rather than being subsequent to the constitution of the object, stands at the very basis of all association and constitution. Finally, in order to better see how the ego serves as a function of that which affects it, and is thereby open to the novelty of the event, I undertake an analysis of sleep, wakefulness, and their relation to attentiveness. I maintain, in closing, that Husserl's study of attention needs to be supplemented with what I refer to as a non-directed attention.