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Direct cash transfers for vulnerable elderly and disabled populations have been provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare (Kementerian Sosial, Kemensos) since 2006; a similar cash transfer for at-risk youth was inaugurated in 2009. The Government of Indonesia's (GoI) pro-poor development initiatives, international agreements and domestic laws and regulations, and considerable experience delivering more general social assistance programs led to the creation of cash transfers for these historically neglected and difficult-to-reach groups. These programs Jaminan Sosial Lanjut Usia (JSLU), Jaminan Sosial Paca Berat (JSPACA), and program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak (PKSA) for the elderly, disabled, and youth respectively transfer cash directly to beneficiaries. They account for increasing shares of the Kemensos overall budget, but subsidies directed to care and rehabilitation facilities as well as direct provision of institutional care still account for a noticeable portion of the Kemensos budget for these groups. Program support operations socialization and outreach; allocation, targeting and prioritization; monitoring and evaluation; and complaints and grievances have very small budgets and depend crucially on cooperation and enthusiasm from local governments and facilitators. A full range of safeguarding activities is spelled out in program guidelines but these have not been institutionalized at the local implementation level. There is variation in the content, methods, frequency, completion rates, and outcomes in all safeguarding activities, and no easy-to-use reporting process that would ensure information from implementation level reaches the central funding and policy agency, Kemensos. The note summarizes quantitative and qualitative evidence in order to build a sound foundation for evaluating the cash transfer programs JSLU, JSPACA, and PKSA provided by Kemensos. The evidence on which the evaluation is based here is composed primarily of first-hand observation of the programs in operation. Where possible information collected from administrative records, including monitoring and evaluation reports, and from Kemensos itself, is summarized. Design features, efficiency and effectiveness of program implementation and operation, and impacts (intended or not) the program produces for beneficiaries are all analyzed in as much detail as possible. Current policy planning within Kemensos assumes expansion of these programs in the coming years, so an evaluation of the programs' features is relevant for Indonesian policymakers and stakeholders.

Administrative Costs --- Bank Accounts --- Capital Expenditures --- Cash Transfers --- Child Care --- Cost of Living --- Data Collection --- Debt --- Developing Countries --- Development Policy --- Drugs --- Economies of Scale --- Expenditures --- Family Health --- Governance --- Gross Domestic Product --- Household Surveys --- Housing --- Human Resources --- Inflation --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Mortality --- Nutrition --- Penalties --- Public officials --- Public Sector Development --- Purchasing Power --- Quality of Life --- Racial Discrimination --- Savings --- Self-Confidence --- Social Insurance --- Social Networks --- Social Protections & Assistance --- Social Protections and Labor --- Urban Areas --- Vulnerable Groups --- Wages

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Public expenditure on household-based social assistance (SA) in Indonesia has increased significantly since 2005. From a low base in the early 2000s, Indonesia's aggregate national public expenditures on SA permanently increased from 2005 after the central government allocated a portion of the savings from fuel subsidy reforms to a number of SA initiatives. In 2010, national expenditures on SA are estimated at Rp 29,709 billion (USD 3.3 billion), equivalent to 2.6 percent of total national expenditures and 0.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Indonesia's strong fiscal position leaves Indonesia well placed to further increase SA expenditures. Declining debt payments and subsidy reductions have opened up fiscal space over the past decade and supported a general increase in social sector and SA spending. With debt-to-GDP of just 25 percent in 2010, Indonesia could further increase expenditure on both items without raising debt levels. Nonetheless, current expenditures on SA are dwarfed by spending on regressive energy subsidies which in some years consume over 20 percent of total national expenditures. The increase in spending after 2005 primarily reflects greater central government investment in programs to protect poor households from fuel and food shocks as well as large health and education expenses. The central government is the dominant player in the SA sector, accounting for almost 90 percent of total expenditures. In years when the government has increased regulated fuel prices (2005-06 and 2008-09), the largest compensatory SA response has been an unconditional cash transfer program (BLT) to vulnerable households to help cushion them from the inflationary shock.

Accounting --- Administrative Costs --- Baseline Scenario --- Capital Expenditures --- Cash Transfers --- Conflict --- Debt --- Decentralization --- Electricity --- Energy Subsidies --- Financial Crisis --- Food Subsidies --- Gross Domestic Product --- Health Insurance --- Housing --- Human Rights --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- National Security --- Natural Disasters --- Nutrition --- Poverty Reduction --- Public Debt --- Public Health --- Public Sector Development --- Public Spending --- Rural Development --- Rural Poverty Reduction --- Savings --- Social Insurance --- Social Protections & Assistance --- Social Protections and Labor --- Social Security System --- Subnational Governments --- Technical Assistance --- Uncertainty --- Urban Poverty --- Villages

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A new coalition government was formed in September 2012 following the collapse of the previous government at the end of August 2012. The Kyrgyz economy experienced a significant decline during the first half of 2012 caused by disrupted operations at the Kumtor gold mine. A decline in gold exports combined with a higher level of imports has increased the current account deficit. Expansionary fiscal policy during the first half of the year along with revenue weakness during the remainder of the year will widen the fiscal deficit to 6.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 from 4.8 percent of GDP a year ago. The medium-term growth outlook is favorable although there are significant downside risks. There are also exogenous shocks that will need to be mitigated, including rising food prices, spillover effects from the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis, and a weak global economy.

Access to Finance --- Agricultural Sector --- Agriculture --- Banking Sector --- Business Environment --- Capital Expenditures --- Corruption --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Economic Growth --- Economic Policy --- Educational Attainment --- External Shocks --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Management --- Financial Sector --- Fiscal & Monetary Policy --- Fiscal Policy --- Gdp --- Global Economy --- Inflation --- Infrastructure Investment --- Investment Climate --- Labor Market --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monetary Policy --- Natural Resources --- Pension Reform --- Privatization --- Productivity --- Public Debt --- Public Finance --- Public Investment --- Savings --- Sovereign Debt --- Transparency --- Transport --- Unemployment --- Urban Areas --- Wages

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The World Bank's Mongolia quarterly economic update assesses recent economic and social developments and policies in Mongolia. It also presents findings of ongoing World Bank activities in Mongolia. The Mongolian economy is continuing to grow at a very rapid pace, expanding by 16.7 percent year-on-year (yoy) in first quarter (Q1). This high growth however, is also fuelling inflation which touched 16 percent in April, well above the Bank of Mongolia's (BoM) inflation target of 10 percent. Increasing government spending on wages and salaries, large cash handouts to the general population, and burgeoning capital expenditures are adding to the demand pressures. Meanwhile, the worsening global economic outlook, in particular a faster than expected slowdown in China, Mongolia's largest trading partner, has negatively impacted export growth, resulting in deterioration in external balances. Under these circumstances, the advice to Mongolian policy-makers is to 'hold your horses' and adopt a more cautious macro-economic stance, tightening both monetary and fiscal policy to prevent further over-heating of the economy. The global economic outlook has deteriorated considerably in recent months. Financial conditions in high-income Europe, higher oil prices, and, most importantly, the slowing Chinese economy pose risks for Mongolia. The channels through which these operate include financial and trade linkages namely volatility in commodity prices and through demand from China for its mineral exports. Indeed, signs of these are already visible as demonstrated by the decline in exports in April. Other financial market linkages should also not be discounted: Mongolia's banking system, which has shown signs of overheating over the past year, is highly dollarized, with about a third of deposits denominated in dollars and easy convertibility out of the Mongolia Togrog. A sharp economic slowdown and/or an increased macroeconomic instability could expose the liquidity and asset quality vulnerabilities in individual banks and system overall.

Accounting --- Administrative Costs --- Bailouts --- Banking Sector --- Bonds --- Capacity Building --- Capital Expenditures --- Cash Transfers --- Central Banks --- Commercial Banks --- Commodity Prices --- Corporate Governance --- Credibility --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Developing Countries --- Development Banking --- Economic Forecasting --- Economic Growth --- Employment --- Expenditures --- Exporters --- External Shocks --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Fiscal & Monetary Policy --- Fiscal Policy --- Foreign Direct Investment --- Global Economy --- Gross Domestic Product --- Housing --- Human Capital --- Income Distribution --- Income Tax --- Inflation --- Interest Rates --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monetary Policy --- Mortgages --- Poverty Reduction --- Public Debt --- Purchasing Power --- Remittances --- Risk Management --- Savings --- Slowdown --- Sovereign Debt --- Transport --- Uncertainty --- Urban Development --- Wages

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After they achieved 2.2 percent growth in 2011, early indications are that the economies of the six countries in South East Europe (the SEE6: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) are slowing drastically and can expect just 1.1 percent growth in 2012. Economic conditions in the Euro zone are holding back economic activity and depressing government revenues in SEE6 countries. With both public debt and financing pressures high, most countries in the region need to embark on major fiscal consolidation programs if they are to reverse their adverse debt dynamics and avoid financing problems down the road. The good news is that in general the SEE6 financial sectors are still relatively well placed, despite elevated risks and vulnerability to adverse shocks, especially the possibility of contagion if the Greek crisis should intensify. The bad news is social: SEE6 countries have the highest unemployment and poverty rates in Europe. Yet even with the difficult short-term situation, SEE6 countries now have historic opportunity to board the European 'convergence train' and over the long term reduce their per capita income gap with developed European Union (EU) countries. All earlier entrants were able to 'catch up quickly.' In principle, the same 'convergence train' is now pulling into the EU candidate countries in SEE6; but these gains are not automatic, they will materialize only if country policies and reforms facilitate them. The long-term SEE6 structural reform agenda must leverage greater trade and financial integration and reform labor markets and the public sector.

Access to Finance --- Accounting --- Analysis of Economic Growth --- Banking Sector --- Bankruptcy --- Bonds --- Business Environment --- Capital Expenditures --- Central Banks --- Commodity Prices --- Debt Markets --- Economic Management --- Economic theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Employment --- Exchange Rates --- Expenditures --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Crisis --- Financial Sector --- Financial Stability --- Fiscal Policy --- Foreign Banks --- Global Economy --- Host Countries --- Income Tax --- Inflation --- Infrastructure Investment --- Insurance --- Interest Rates --- International Financial Institutions --- Legislation --- Macroeconomic Management --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Migration --- Monetary Policy --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Privatization --- Productivity --- Public Debt --- Public Spending --- Public-Private Partnerships --- Regulators --- Remittances --- Retirement --- Rule of Law --- Sovereign Debt --- Tax Administration --- Trade Liberalization --- Transparency --- Wages