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Introduction to International Disaster Management, Second Edition continues to serve as the sole comprehensive overview of global emergency management. This second edition contains updated information on disaster trends as well as on management structures and advancements around the world. Coppola includes changes that reflect the dual theme of the book: universal principles of global emergency management practice and advances in the field worldwide, and lessons from disasters and other watershed events that have occurred since the first edition was published. This text in

Disaster relief --- Emergency management --- Hazard mitigation. --- International cooperation. --- Disaster mitigation --- Disaster risk mitigation --- Disaster risk reduction --- Disasters --- Hazards mitigation --- Mitigation, Hazard --- Natural hazard mitigation --- Natural hazards mitigation --- Reduction of risks of disasters --- Risk mitigation, Disaster --- Risk reduction, Disaster --- Consequence management (Emergency management) --- Disaster planning --- Disaster preparedness --- Disaster prevention --- Emergencies --- Emergency planning --- Emergency preparedness --- Management --- Public safety --- First responders --- Disaster assistance --- Emergency assistance in disasters --- Emergency relief --- Human services --- Risk mitigation --- Planning --- Preparedness --- Prevention

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This paper presents a dynamic model of the reinsurance market for catastrophe risks. The model is based on the classical capacity-constraint assumption. Reinsurers choose every year the quantity of risk they cover and the level of external capital they raise to cover these risks. The model exhibits time dependency and reproduces a market dynamics that shares many features with the real market. In particular, market price increases and reinsurance coverage decreases after large shocks, and a series of smaller losses may have a deeper impact than one larger loss. There is a significant oligopoly effect reducing reinsurance supply, and the market is segregated into strategic large actors that influence market prices and price-taker smaller firms. A regulation trade-off between market efficiency and resilience is identified and quantified: improving the ability of the market to cope with exceptional events increases the cost of reinsurance. This model provides an interesting basis to analyze further capacity needs for the insurance industry in view of growing worldwide exposure to catastrophic risks and climate change.

Climate Change Economics --- Debt Markets --- Dynamic model --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Insurance & Risk Mitigation --- Markets and Market Access --- Natural disasters --- Regulation --- Reinsurance

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This paper presents a dynamic model of the reinsurance market for catastrophe risks. The model is based on the classical capacity-constraint assumption. Reinsurers choose every year the quantity of risk they cover and the level of external capital they raise to cover these risks. The model exhibits time dependency and reproduces a market dynamics that shares many features with the real market. In particular, market price increases and reinsurance coverage decreases after large shocks, and a series of smaller losses may have a deeper impact than one larger loss. There is a significant oligopoly effect reducing reinsurance supply, and the market is segregated into strategic large actors that influence market prices and price-taker smaller firms. A regulation trade-off between market efficiency and resilience is identified and quantified: improving the ability of the market to cope with exceptional events increases the cost of reinsurance. This model provides an interesting basis to analyze further capacity needs for the insurance industry in view of growing worldwide exposure to catastrophic risks and climate change.

Climate Change Economics --- Debt Markets --- Dynamic model --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Insurance & Risk Mitigation --- Markets and Market Access --- Natural disasters --- Regulation --- Reinsurance

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The consumer financial services sector in South Africa is among the most sophisticated in the world, yet nearly 40 percent of the population, especially blacks, use no formal financial services. The now ubiquitous mobile phones are dramatically changing the landscape of digital financial services but weak financial literacy and general literacy of the underserved population remain the Achilles Heel. At the same time, weak competition in the South African financial services sector is an issue - just 4 banks control over 80 percent of retail banking and over 90 percent of personal transactions, maintaining rates and fees above competitive levels. The 2010 FinScope survey found that consumer trust was higher in informal financial institutions than in the formal ones such as banks. The South African Government has embarked on a substantive program of improving the financial sector legislation and establishing a full market conduct regulator. Presented in two volumes, this World Bank's review compares the South African framework for financial consumer protection (FCP) to international practice and provides recommendations to strengthen it. Volume I summarizes South Africa's FCP policies, describes the recent surveys, and sets out the key findings and recommendations of the Review. Volume II provides an assessment of banking, securities, insurance, and private pensions segments and discusses the key issues in retail payments and remittances and financial education.

Consumer Protection --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Regulation & Supervision --- Financial Services --- Insurance --- Insurance & Risk Mitigation --- Pensions & Retirement Systems --- Securities Markets Policy & Regulation --- Social Protections and Labor

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The global financial crisis brought public guarantees to the forefront of the policy debate. Based on a review of the theoretical foundations of public guarantees, this paper concludes that the commonly used justifications for public guarantees based solely on agency frictions (such as adverse selection or lack of collateral) and/or un-internalized externalities are flawed. When risk is idiosyncratic, it is highly unlikely that a case for guarantees can be made without risk aversion. When risk aversion is explicitly added to the picture, public guarantees may be justified by the state's natural advantage in dealing with collective action failures (providing public goods). The state can spread risk more finely across space and time because it can coordinate and pool atomistic agents that would otherwise not organize themselves to solve monitoring or commitment problems. Public guarantees may be transitory, until financial systems mature, or permanent, when risk is fat-tailed. In the case of aggregate (non-diversifiable) risk, permanent public guarantees may also be justified, but in this case the state adds value not by spreading risk but by coordinating agents. In addition to greater transparency in justifying public guarantees, the analysis calls for exploiting the natural complementarities between the state and the markets in bearing risk.

Access to Finance --- Arrow-Lind theorem --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Debt Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial intermediaries --- Insurance & Risk Mitigation --- Labor Policies --- Lender of last resort --- Partial credit guarantees --- Public guarantees --- Public risk absorption --- Risk premia