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Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a “tipping set,” a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.
Digital
Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Using a unique dataset of insurance decisions by over 1,800 large U.S. corporations, this study provides the first empirical analysis of firm behavior that compares corporate demand for property and catastrophe insurance (here, terrorism). We combine demand and supply data and apply a simultaneous-equation approach to address the problem of endogenous premium decisions. The main finding is that demand for property and catastrophe insurance are not very different and that the demand for catastrophe coverage is actually more price inelastic. We also show that a corporation's ability to self-insure affects the demand for catastrophe insurance but not for property insurance.
Book
Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.
Book
Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
Using a unique dataset of insurance decisions by over 1,800 large U.S. corporations, this study provides the first empirical analysis of firm behavior that compares corporate demand for property and catastrophe insurance (here, terrorism). We combine demand and supply data and apply a simultaneous-equation approach to address the problem of endogenous premium decisions. The main finding is that demand for property and catastrophe insurance are not very different and that the demand for catastrophe coverage is actually more price inelastic. We also show that a corporation's ability to self-insure affects the demand for catastrophe insurance but not for property insurance.
Book
ISBN: 9780812205473 Year: 2011 Publisher: Philadelphia
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