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Financial Innovation, the Discovery of Risk, and the U.S. Credit Crisis
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Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

Uncertainty about the riskiness of a new financial environment was an important factor behind the U.S. credit crisis. We show that a boom-bust cycle in debt, asset prices and consumption characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of a model with a collateral constraint in which agents learn "by observation" the true riskiness of the new environment. Early realizations of states with high ability to leverage assets into debt turn agents overly optimistic about the probability of persistence of a high-leverage regime. Conversely, the first realization of the low-leverage state turns agents unduly pessimistic about future credit prospects. These effects interact with the Fisherian deflation mechanism, resulting in changes in debt, leverage, and asset prices larger than predicted under either rational expectations without learning or with learning but without Fisherian deflation. The model can account for 69 percent of the rise in net household debt and 53 percent of the rise in residential land prices between 1997 and 2006, and it predicts a sharp collapse in 2007.


Digital
Overborrowing, Financial Crises and 'Macro-prudential' Taxes
Authors: ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

We study overborrowing and financial crises in an equilibrium model of business cycles and asset prices with collateral constraints. Private agents in a decentralized competitive equilibrium do not internalize the effects of their individual borrowing plans on the market price of assets at which collateral is valued and on the wage costs relevant for working capital financing. Compared with a constrained social planner who internalizes these effects, they undervalue the benefits of an increase in net worth when the constraint binds and hence they borrow "too much" ex ante. Quantitatively, average debt and leverage ratios are only slightly larger in the competitive equilibrium, but the incidence and magnitude of financial crises is much larger. Excess asset returns, Sharpe ratios and the market price of risk are also much larger. A state-contingent tax on debt of about 1 percent on average supports the planner's allocations as a competitive equilibrium and increases social welfare.


Book
Financial innovation, the discovery of risk, and the U.S. credit crisis.
Authors: ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: London Centre For Economic Policy Research

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Digital
How Big (Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers?
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

We contribute to the intense debate on the real effects of fiscal stimuli by showing that the impact of government expenditure shocks depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, and public indebtedness. Based on a novel quarterly dataset of government expenditure in 44 countries, we find that (i) the output effect of an increase in government consumption is larger in industrial than in developing countries, (ii) the fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating under predetermined exchange rate but zero in economies operating under flexible exchange rates; (iii) fiscal multipliers in open economies are lower than in closed economies and (iv) fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries are also zero.


Book
Financial Innovation, the Discovery of Risk, and the U.S. Credit Crisis
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

Financial innovation and overconfidence about asset values and the riskiness of new financial products were important factors behind the U.S. credit crisis. We show that a boom-bust cycle in debt, asset prices and consumption characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of a model with a collateral constraint in which agents learn y observation" the true riskiness of a new financial environment. Early realizations of states with high ability to leverage assets into debt turn agents overly optimistic about the persistence probability of a high-leverage regime. Conversely, the first realization of a low-leverage state turns agents unduly pessimistic about future credit prospects. These effects interact with the Fisherian deflation mechanism, resulting in changes in debt, leverage, and asset prices larger than predicted under either rational expectations without learning or with learning but without Fisherian deflation. The model predicts a large, sustained increase in net household debt and in residential land prices between 1997 and 2006, followed by a sharp collapse in 2007.

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Book
Overborrowing, Financial Crises and 'Macro-prudential' Taxes
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

An equilibrium model of financial crises driven by Irving Fisher's financial amplification mechanism features a pecuniary externality, because private agents do not internalize how the price of assets used for collateral respond to collective borrowing decisions, particularly when binding collateral constraints cause asset fire-sales and lead to a financial crisis. As a result, agents in the competitive equilibrium borrow "too much" ex ante, compared with a financial regulator who internalizes the externality. Quantitative analysis calibrated to U.S. data shows that average debt and leverage are only slightly larger in the competitive equilibrium, but the incidence and magnitude of financial crises are much larger. Excess asset returns, Sharpe ratios and the price of risk are also much larger, and the distribution of returns displays endogenous fat tails. State-contingent taxes on debt and dividends of about 1 and -0.5 percent on average respectively support the regulator's allocations as a competitive equilibrium.

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Book
How Big (Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers?
Authors: --- --- ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

We contribute to the debate on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal stimuli by showing that the impact of government expenditure shocks depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, and public indebtedness. Based on a novel quarterly dataset of government expenditure in 44 countries, we find that (i) the output effect of an increase in government consumption is larger in industrial than in developing countries, (ii) the fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating under predetermined exchange rates but is zero in economies operating under flexible exchange rates; (iii) fiscal multipliers in open economies are smaller than in closed economies; (iv) fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries are negative.

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