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Rent --- Rent (Economic theory) --- S11/0920 --- S11/0570 --- China: Social sciences--Corruption --- China: Social sciences--Guanxi --- Ground-rent --- Payment --- Landlord and tenant --- Real property --- Economic rent --- Economics --- Land use --- Rent seeking --- Law and legislation --- Rente --- Loyers --- Chine
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This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents' rational ignorance about small per person effects, governance institutions' control of rent seeking by political leaders, governments' revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy making. We also find that larger groups obtain more favorable policies, suggesting that positive group size effects outweigh any negative influence from free ridership, and that demographically driven entry of new farmers is associated with less favorable farm policies, suggesting the arrival of new farmers erodes policy rents and discourages political activity by incumbents. Another new result is that governments achieve very little price stabilization relative to our benchmark estimates of undistorted prices, and governments in the poorest countries actually destabilize domestic prices.
Agricultural Sector Economics --- Agricultural Trade --- Agriculture --- Collective Action --- Consumers --- Data Quality --- Developing Countries --- Economic Development --- Employment --- Gdp --- Low-Income Countries --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Per Capita Income --- Political Economy --- Political Institutions --- Poverty and Trade --- Price Stability --- Rent Seeking --- Savings --- Trade Policy --- Transaction Costs --- World Development Indicators
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In a recent survey of European economic growth since 1950, Crafts and Toniolo (2008) conclude that incentive structures are a crucial explanator of comparative growth rates of the economies of east and west Europe. Pre-empting that, a 2006 report on trade performance and policies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia included as one of its key recommendations the need to reduce the mean and variance of the tariff equivalents of trade barriers, and in particular to reduce unilaterally the policy regimes' anti-export bias, especially in countries exporting primary products (Broadman 2006). To progress such reform in Europe's transition economies efficiently and effectively, and to see how recent policies line up with those of the European Union (EU), requires better information on the extent of reform during the past two decades and of current policy influences on incentives within and between sectors. Immediately prior to their transition to market economies, policies in the region greatly distorted producer and consumer incentives, especially for agricultural products. Those distortions have been reduced substantially in several countries, but large variations remain across the region and distortions appear to be growing again in some countries. Now is thus an opportune time to examine how policies affecting agriculture are evolving in this region, including as part of the adjustment to EU accession for ten of the transition economies in the region.
Agricultural Policy --- Agricultural Sector Economics --- Agricultural Trade --- Agriculture --- Beef --- Consumers --- Debt --- Development Policy --- Economic Development --- Exchange Rates --- Expenditures --- Financial Institutions --- Food Processing --- Food Security --- Foreign Direct Investment --- Gdp --- Grains --- Hunger --- Industrialization --- Labor Market --- Livestock --- Maize --- Market Economy --- Marketing --- Political Economy --- Property Rights --- Protectionism --- Rent Seeking --- Rice --- Rural Development --- Sugar --- Surplus --- Trade Barriers --- Trade Liberalization --- Trade Policy --- Vertical Integration --- Wages --- Wheat --- World Development Indicators --- World Trade Organization
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This paper analyzes the political and institutional factors which are behind the dramatic changes in distortions to agricultural incentives in the transition countries in East Asia, Central Asia, and the rest of the former Soviet Union, and in Central and Eastern Europe. The paper explains why these changes have occurred and why there are large differences among transition countries in the extent and the nature of the remaining distortions.
Agricultural Sector Economics --- Agricultural Trade --- Agriculture --- Arbitrage --- Bureaucracy --- Crops --- Economic Development --- Economic Systems --- Economics --- Exchange Rates --- Financial Institutions --- Food Processing --- Food Production --- Foreign Direct Investment --- Gdp --- Industrialization --- Labor Policies --- Land Reform --- Livestock --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Economy --- Marketing --- Overemployment --- Per Capita Income --- Political Economy --- Property Rights --- Protectionism --- Regime Change --- Rent Seeking --- Rural Development --- Social Protections and Labor --- Socialism --- Total Factor Productivity --- Trade Liberalization --- Trade Policy --- Wages --- World Trade Organization
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This paper focuses on core aspects of the political economy of reform, drawing on case studies of three economies transitioning to stronger business environments (Hungary, the Republic of Korea, and Mexico) and three countries with well-developed business environments (Australia, Italy, and the United Kingdom). The purpose is threefold: first, to identify so-called drivers of reform among successfully reforming countries; second, to explore how a reform strategy can make optimal use of the opportunities provided by the drivers of change; and third; to suggest how these lessons can be proactively used by other reformers to design and guide reforms. The case study findings suggest that, regardless of the content of reform, success is influenced by an evolving mix of seven drivers of change: i) globalization or competitiveness; ii) crisis; iii) political leadership; iv) unfolding reform synergies; v) technocrats; vi) changes in civil society, and vii) external pressure. The case studies suggest that reformers can influence the direction and pace of change by mobilizing and exploiting drivers of it. Rather than a cause-and-effect scenario in which a single driver-such as a crisis-creates and defines the success of a body of reforms, what happens is an unfolding series of events in which various drivers become more and less important in defining phases of the reform process.
Accountability --- Bankruptcy --- Bureaucracy --- Capital Markets --- Consumer Protection --- Consumers --- Corruption --- Corruption & anticorruption Law --- Debt --- Deregulation --- Developed Countries --- Developing Countries --- Economic Development --- Economic Liberalization --- Economics --- Enterprise Development & Reform --- Financial Crisis --- Financial Sector --- Foreign Direct Investment --- Free Trade Agreements --- Globalization --- Good Governance --- Gross Domestic Product --- Investment Climate --- Job Creation --- Judiciary --- Labor Market --- Law and Development --- Leadership --- Low-Income Countries --- Macroeconomics --- Market Economy --- Marketing --- Monopolies --- Open Markets --- Political Economy --- Private Investment --- Private Sector Development --- Property Rights --- Public Debt --- Regulators --- Rent Seeking --- Rule of Law --- Small Businesses --- Trade Liberalization --- Transaction Costs --- Transparency --- Unemployment
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This paper analyzes how investment incentives may or may not be used to foster private investment, particularly in developing countries. As practitioners and policymakers can attest, political economy exerts a powerful influence on incentives. Many incentives especially generous ones have persisted because of lobbying by special interests and politicians' need to curry favor. Yet little research has been done on how political economy affects incentive policy. Second, the paper sheds light on the role that political economy plays in the popularity of incentives and the related shortcomings. Incentives are sometimes used to dole out favors to investors, so investors who benefit from incentives resist attempts to eliminate them. This paper suggests a way to tackle such problems. Third, the paper compiles good practices on managing and administering incentives in developing countries, drawing on government and private sector experiences. Finally, the paper provides policymakers with a framework for analyzing the efficacy of investment incentives based on the sector and level of development involved, and suggests reforms for moving toward best practice.
Audits --- Business Development --- Business Environment --- Debt Markets --- Decision Making --- Developing Countries --- Economic theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Expenditures --- Exporters --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Fiscal Policy --- Foreign Direct Investment --- Fraud --- Gdp --- Host Countries --- Income Tax --- Inflation --- International Finance --- Job Creation --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monetary Policy --- Multinational Corporations --- Natural Resources --- Outsourcing --- Per Capita Income --- Political Economy --- Private Investment --- Private Sector Development --- Public Finance --- Public-Private Partnerships --- Rent Seeking --- Rule of Law --- Savings --- Tax Administration --- Tax Evasion --- Tax Exemptions --- Tax Policy --- Taxation & Subsidies --- Technical Assistance --- Telecommunications --- Transparency --- Unemployment
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