Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.

Monopolistic competition --- Exclusive contracts --- Externalities (Economics) --- Competition --- Barriers to entry (Industrial organization) --- Mathematical models. --- Mathematical models. --- Mathematical models. --- Mathematical models. --- Mathematical models.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The economy of the Philippines is open to trade and capital inflows, and has grown rapidly since 2002. Over the last 10 years, however, domestic investment, while stagnant in real terms, has shrunk as a share of GDP. In an open and growing economy, why the decline? Three reasons explain the puzzle. First, the public sector cannot afford expanding its investment at GDP growth rates. Second, the capital-intensive private sector does not find it convenient to raise investment at the economy's pace. Third, fast-growing businesses in the service sector do not need to rapidly increase investment to enjoy rising profits. Yet, the economy keeps growing. On the demand-side, massive labor migration results in remittances that fuel consumption-led-growth. On the supply-side, free from rent-capturing regulations, a few non-capital-intensive manufactures and services boost exports. The economic system is in equilibrium at a low level of capital stock, where all economic agents have no incentive to unilaterally increase investment and the first mover bears short-term costs. As a consequence, growth is slower and less inclusive than it could be. To make it speedier and more sustainable, and to reduce unemployment and poverty, the economy needs to move to a "high-capital-stock" equilibrium. This would be attainable through better-performing eco-zones, a competitive exchange rate, greater government revenues, and fewer elite-capturing regulations.

Access to Finance --- Agriculture --- Barriers to Entry --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Economic Growth --- Economic Theory and Research --- Environment --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Equilibrium --- Exports --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- GDP --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Marginal Product --- Political Economy --- Unemployment --- Wages