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Meet the economic gangster. He's the United Nations diplomat who double-parks his Mercedes on New York City streets at rush hour because the cops can't touch him--he has diplomatic immunity. He's the Chinese smuggler who dodges tariffs by magically transforming frozen chickens into frozen turkeys. The dictator, the warlord, the unscrupulous bureaucrat who bilks the developing world of billions in aid. The calculating crook who views stealing and murder as just another part of his business strategy. And, in the wrong set of circumstances, he might just be you. In Economic Gangsters

Economic order --- Third World: economic development problems --- Public administration --- Political sociology --- Developing countries --- Corruption --- Political corruption --- Smuggling. --- 844.2 sociaaleconomische structuur --- 848 Geweld --- armoede --- delicten --- economische groei --- economische politiek --- inkomensverdeling --- ontwikkelingshulp --- ontwikkelingslanden --- welvaartseconomie --- 330.34 --- Contraband trade --- Rumrunning --- Crime --- Customs administration --- Boss rule --- Corruption (in politics) --- Graft in politics --- Malversation --- Political scandals --- Politics, Practical --- Misconduct in office --- Corrupt practices --- Ethics --- Economic aspects. --- Economische ontwikkeling. Regionale economische ontwikkeling --- -Political corruption --- -Smuggling --- 364.1323 --- Economic aspects --- -Electronic information resources --- E-books --- 330.34 Economische ontwikkeling. Regionale economische ontwikkeling --- Smuggling --- 858 Geweld --- Sociologie van de politiek --- Economische orde --- Derde Wereld: economische ontwikkelingsproblematiek --- Openbaar bestuur --- Ontwikkelingslanden --- Developing countries: economic development problems

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Can some acts of violence be explained by a society's "culture"? Scholars have found it hard to empirically disentangle the effects of culture, legal institutions, and poverty in driving violence. We address this problem by exploiting a natural experiment offered by the presence of thousands of international soccer (football) players in the European professional leagues. We find a strong relationship between the history of civil conflict in a player's home country and his propensity to behave violently on the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. This link is robust to region fixed effects, country characteristics (e.g., rule of law, per capita income), player characteristics (e.g., age, field position, quality), outliers, and team fixed effects. Reinforcing our claim that we isolate cultures of violence rather than simple rule-breaking or something else entirely, there is no meaningful correlation between a player's home country civil war history and soccer performance measures not closely related to violent conduct.