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Frustration with the performance of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) has led to two rounds of reform: the first round, from the 1960s through the 1980s, attempted to improve SOE performance while maintaining public ownership while the second, beginning in the late 1980s, viewed privatization as the answer. Interest in the earlier round of reform has increased recently as controversy has slowed or halted privatization in many countries, especially for SOEs providing infrastructure services that are basic to everyday life and are thought to have elements of monopoly. This paper reexamines the earlier round of reforms, focusing particularly on efforts to increase the firms' capacity with infusions of human and physical capital, to strengthen managerial incentives through performance contracts and corporatization and to alter the mix of political and economic forces that impinge on the firm by strengthening the involvement of taxpayers, customers or private investors. The review suggests that these earlier approaches generated only modest success but that some of them, selectively applied, may be helpful in improving the performance of infrastructure firms that remain in public hands.

Capital Markets --- Debt Markets --- Developing Countries --- E-Business --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Support --- Government Capacity --- Information Asymmetry --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- International Bank --- Legal System --- Microfinance --- Political Economy --- Private Capital --- Private Investors --- Private Participation in Infrastructure --- Private Sector Development

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Economic theory suggests that countries should ignore uncertainty for public investment and behave as if indifferent to risk because they can pool risks to a much greater extent than private investors can. This paper discusses the general economic theory in the case of developing countries. The analysis identifies several cases where the government's risk-neutral assumption does not hold, thus making rational the use of ex ante risk financing instruments, including sovereign insurance. The paper discusses the optimal level of sovereign insurance. It argues that, because sovereign insurance is usually more expensive than post-disaster financing, it should mainly cover immediate needs, while long-term expenditures should be financed through post-disaster financing (including ex post borrowing and tax increases). In other words, sovereign insurance should not aim at financing the long-term resource gap, but only the short-term liquidity need.

Banks and Banking Reform --- Debt Markets --- Developing Countries --- Environment --- Expenditures --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Hazard Risk Management --- Insurance --- Insurance and Risk Mitigation --- Long-term resource --- Natural Disaster --- Natural Disasters --- Private investors --- Public investment --- Risk Management --- Safety Net --- Tax --- Urban Development