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Gods. --- Belief and doubt --- Religious aspects.
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Belief and doubt --- Faith --- Finland --- Religious life and customs.
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This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to a thought-content T just in case one (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a certain sentence S of one's language of thought that satisfies what T encodes, which in turn requires that S's non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantical relations to items specified by T. Since these items may include other senses as well as ordinary objects, beliefs of arbitrary complexity are automatically accommodated. Within the framework of the formal ontology, a context-dependent compositional semantics is then provided for a fragment of regimented English capable of formulating ascriptions of belief a semantics that treats substitutional opacity as a genuine semantic datum. Finally, the resulting picture of belief and its attribution is defended by showing how it solves standard puzzles, avoids objections to rival accounts, and satisfies certain adequacy conditions not fulfilled by traditional theories. Along the way, clarification and defense is offered for the ingredient conception of object-dependent senses, and it is shown how adoption of the language of thought hypothesis permits Bertrand Russell's obscure doctrine of logical forms to be understood in a way that not only vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief but also reveals the connection between these logical forms and thought-contents.
Belief and doubt. --- Belief and doubt --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Skepticism
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The Wisdom to Doubt is a major contribution to the contemporary literature on the epistemology of religious belief. Continuing the inquiry begun in his previous book, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, J. L. Schellenberg here argues that given our limitations and especially our immaturity as a species, there is no reasonable choice but to withhold judgment about the existence of an ultimate salvific reality. Schellenberg defends this conclusion against arguments from religious experience and naturalistic arguments that might seem to make either religious belief or religious disbelief preferable to his skeptical stance. In so doing, he canvasses virtually all of the important recent work on the epistemology of religion. Of particular interest is his call for at least skepticism about theism, the most common religious claim among philosophers.The Wisdom to Doubt expands the author's well-known hiddenness argument against theism and situates it within a larger atheistic argument, itself made to serve the purposes of his broader skeptical case. That case need not, on Schellenberg's view, lead to a dead end but rather functions as a gateway to important new insights about intellectual tasks and religious possibilities.
Skepticism. --- Belief and doubt. --- Religion --- Scepticism --- Unbelief --- Agnosticism --- Belief and doubt --- Free thought --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Will --- Rationalism --- Skepticism --- Philosophy.
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Truth. --- Theory of knowledge --- Truth --- Conviction --- Belief and doubt --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism
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Error. --- Belief and doubt --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Relativity --- Truth --- Truthfulness and falsehood --- General ethics
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Roman law --- Truth --- Roman law. --- Truth. --- Conviction --- Civil law --- Civil law (Roman law) --- Law --- Law, Roman --- Belief and doubt --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism
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Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls ""moderate moral skepticism,"" which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.
Ethics --- Skepticism --- Ethics. --- Skepticism. --- Scepticism --- Unbelief --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Agnosticism --- Belief and doubt --- Free thought --- Philosophy --- Values --- Acqui 2006
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