Narrow your search

Library

KU Leuven (2)

UAntwerpen (2)


Resource type

book (2)

digital (2)


Language

English (4)


Year
From To Submit

2006 (4)

Listing 1 - 4 of 4
Sort by

Digital
Long term risk: an operator approach
Authors: ---
Year: 2006 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. NBER

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract


Digital
Pay for short-term performance: executive compensation in speculative markets
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2006 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. NBER

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract


Book
Long Term Risk : An Operator Approach
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2006 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

We create an analytical structure that reveals the long run risk-return relationship for nonlinear continuous time Markov environments. We do so by studying an eigenvalue problem associated with a positive eigenfunction for a conveniently chosen family of valuation operators. This family forms a semigroup whose members are indexed by the elapsed time between payoff and valuation dates. We represent the semigroup using a positive process with three components: an exponential term constructed from the eigenvalue, a martingale and a transient eigenfunction term. The eigenvalue encodes the risk adjustment, the martingale alters the probability measure to capture long run approximation, and the eigenfunction gives the long run dependence on the Markov state. We establish existence and uniqueness of the relevant eigenvalue and eigenfunction. By showing how changes in the stochastic growth components of cash flows induce changes in the corresponding eigenvalues and eigenfunctions, we reveal a long-run risk return tradeoff.

Keywords


Book
Pay for Short-Term Performance : Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets
Authors: --- --- ---
Year: 2006 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets.

Keywords

Listing 1 - 4 of 4
Sort by