Narrow your search

Library

National Bank of Belgium (2)

ULB (2)

Vlerick Business School (2)

Vlaams Parlement (2)


Resource type

book (2)


Language

English (2)


Year
From To Submit

2006 (2)

Listing 1 - 2 of 2
Sort by

Book
A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries
Authors: ---
ISBN: 1451864647 1462388140 1451993234 9786613824592 1451988346 1283512149 Year: 2006 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund,

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible "control regimes" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies.


Book
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : An Analysis of Rent Capture
Authors: --- ---
ISBN: 145186406X 1462397220 1452702411 9786613821782 1451993390 1282474251 Year: 2006 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund,

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes.

Listing 1 - 2 of 2
Sort by