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Financial risk.

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Comment gérer les risques difficilement couvrables par les méthodes classiques de prévention, d'investissement ou d'assurance tels que les risques environnementaux ou de santé ? Les auteurs proposent des éléments d'analyse et des outils adaptés qui permettent de les appréhender.

Investment analysis --- Risk assessment --- Financial risk management --- Mathematical models --- Investment analysis - Mathematical models --- Risk assessment - Mathematical models --- Financial risk management - Mathematical models --- Gestion du risque

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In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to bailing out all potentially distressed banks. Our findings suggest that allowing early bank failures and using available liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can better boost confidence than early bailouts. This conclusion arises because with a high chance of liquidity shortage in the future, depositors may lose confidence and hence withdraw deposits even from potentially sound banks. Such a policy of late bailouts is likely to receive political support when a full bailout needs to be financed by taxation. The logic of late bailout remains valid even when banks may hide their distress or when closures of early distressed banks create contagion.

Bank failures --- Liquidity (Economics) --- Econometric models. --- Assets, Frozen --- Frozen assets --- Failure of banks --- Finance --- Business failures --- Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Macroeconomics --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Macroeconomics: Consumption --- Saving --- Wealth --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Banking --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Financial services law & regulation --- Liquidity --- Bank bailouts --- Blanket guarantee --- Consumption --- Asset and liability management --- Financial crises --- National accounts --- Liquidity risk --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Banks and banking --- Economics --- Crisis management --- Financial risk management --- Korea, Republic of

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In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade-from East Asia to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America-political interference in financial sector regulation helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial regulation, but also hindered regulators and supervisors from taking action against troubled banks. This paper investigates why, to fulfill their mandate to preserve financial sector stability, financial sector regulators and supervisors need to be independent-from the financial services industry as well as from the government-as well as accountable.

Financial risk management. --- Banking --- Banks and Banking --- Banks and banking --- Banks --- Business and Financial --- Central bank autonomy --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Depository Institutions --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Financial Crises --- Financial crises --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Financial Risk Management --- Financial sector --- Financial services industry --- Financial services law & regulation --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Industries: Financial Services --- Law and legislation --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Korea, Republic of

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This paper discusses costs, benefits, and implementation challenges of a possible currency union between Belarus and Russia. It shows that Belarus and Russia are economically closely linked but nevertheless do not fulfill all "optimal currency area" criteria, especially the macroeconomic symmetry condition. Furthermore, we argue that the different speeds of economic liberalization over the past decade have resulted in different economic structures, with Belarus still dependent on monetary financing of budgets and industries. However, a final cost-benefit analysis also needs to consider that currency unification may bring substantial benefits from reduced transaction costs, an improved macroeconomic environment in Belarus, and by acting as a catalyst to advance structural reforms in Belarus.

Currency question --- Monetary unions --- Common currencies --- Currency areas --- Currency unions --- Optimum currency areas --- Money --- Fiat money --- Free coinage --- Monetary question --- Scrip --- Currency crises --- Finance --- Finance, Public --- Legal tender --- Banks and Banking --- Exports and Imports --- Financial Risk Management --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Public Finance --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Foreign Exchange --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- Financial Aspects of Economic Integration --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- International economics --- Banking --- Monetary economics --- Financial services law & regulation --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Public finance & taxation --- Currencies --- Exchange rate risk --- Lender of last resort --- Economic integration --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Financial crises --- Government debt management --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Banks and banking --- Financial risk management --- Banks and banking, Central --- Debts, Public --- Belarus, Republic of