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Debt relief. --- Debt relief --- Mathematical models.

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Public debt --- Europe

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This work guides the reader through every stage of debt recovery, from deciding to take action to serving a claim and the trial itself. It deals comprehensively with enforcing judgement and features sections on bankruptcy, winding up receivership and administration.

Collecting of accounts - Great Britain. --- Debtor and creditor. --- Law - Non-U.S. --- Law, Politics & Government --- Law - Great Britain --- Debt relief. --- Debt relief --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Creditor --- Debtor and creditor --- Law and legislation --- Commercial law --- Contracts --- Obligations (Law) --- Credit --- Creditors' bills --- Fraudulent conveyances --- Liens --- Payment --- Security (Law)

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This annual report presents comprehensive statistics on the gross external debt of 171 developing countries and  countries in transition.  The 2003 edition has been enhanced with additional series providing more detailed breakdowns of categories of debt and time series data going back to end 1998. These figures are compiled by the  OECD, largely on the basis of creditor sources.  All figures are shown in US dollars. The External Debt Statistics database is included in OECD's  International Development Statistics CD-ROM, and is available on line via www.SourceOECD.org  

Public debt --- International finance --- Developing countries

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In principle, international financial institutions (IFIs) can use their leverage as creditors to prompt governments to undertake policy reform. Yet such lending has been frequently linked to unsustainable debt levels and little reform. This paper illustrates how the dual roles of IFIs as purveyors of credit and monitors of reform may help explain these negative outcomes. When debt levels rise, the IFIs reforms goals may become subordinated to its creditor's interest, compromising the enforcement of conditionality. Attracted by this prospect, malevolent governments strategically reform, enhancing their reputation in order to maintain lending and build their debt stock. Once debt levels are sufficiently large, such governments can stop policy reforms, assured that lending will continue.

Exports and Imports --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Investments: Stocks --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Foreign Aid --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Pension Funds --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Institutional Investors --- Finance --- Investment & securities --- International economics --- Distressed assets --- Stocks --- Debt restructuring --- Debt relief --- Debt burden --- Debts, External --- Banks and banking