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The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has encouraged political scientists to re-examine the comparative literature on democratisation. A vast literature has now been produced comparing transitions from authoritarianism and democratisation in different parts of the world. However, there are two major omissions in the transition literature. First, the focus of research has primarily been on national level politics, and second, the relationship between federalism and democracy has largely been overlooked. This study seeks to redress this imbalance by moving the focus of research from the national level to the vitally important processes of institution building and democratisation at the local level and to the study of federalism and democratisation in Russia. Federal states are much more difficult to set up than unitary ones, and forging a new federal system at the same time as privatising the economy and trying to radically overhaul the political system has clearly made Russia's transition triply difficult. This book builds on Cameron Ross' earlier work, 'Regional Politics in Russia', by combining theoretical perspectives with empirical work to provide a comparative analysis of the electoral systems, party systems and governmental systems in the ethnic republics and regions and to assess the impact of theses different institutional arrangements on democratisation and federalism. Overall, this study argues that Russia's weak and asymmetrical form of federalism has played a major role in thwarting the consolidation of democracy. Federalism and democratisation in Russia exist in contradiction rather than harmony. In a vicious circle authoritarianism at the centre has been nourished by authoritarianism in the regions and vice versa. 'Elective dictatorships' and 'delegative democracies' are now well entrenched in many republics and authoritarian regimes are firmly established in a majority of the regions. This book will be vital reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of Russian politics and democratisation.

Democratization. --- Democratic consolidation --- Democratic transition --- Political science --- New democracies --- Russia. --- comparative analysis. --- democratisation. --- electoral systems. --- ethnic republics. --- federalism. --- governmental systems. --- institution building. --- institutional arrangements. --- party systems.

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This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes data module provides a review of Botswana’s data dissemination practices against the IMF’s General Data Dissemination System, complemented by an in-depth assessment of the quality of the national accounts, consumer price index, producer price index, government finance, monetary, and balance-of-payments statistics. All three of Botswana’s statistics producing agencies have a legal and institutional framework that supports statistical quality and demonstrate an awareness of quality as the cornerstone of statistical work. All three agencies also demonstrates professionalism and provide ethical guidelines to their staff.

Accounting --- Macroeconomics --- Statistics --- Civics and Citizenship --- Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology --- Computer Programs: Other --- General Aggregative Models: General --- Formal and Informal Sectors --- Shadow Economy --- Institutional Arrangements --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- Price Level --- Inflation --- Deflation --- Econometrics & economic statistics --- Civil service & public sector --- Public finance accounting --- National accounts --- Government finance statistics --- Civil society organizations --- Balance of payments statistics --- Monetary statistics --- Economic and financial statistics --- Economic sectors --- National income --- Finance --- Civil society --- Balance of payments --- Economic indicators --- Botswana

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There is increasing recognition that corruption has substantial, adverse effects on economic growth. But if the costs of corruption are so high, why don’t countries strive to improve their institutions and root out corruption? Why do many countries appear to be stuck in a vicious circle of widespread corruption and low economic growth, often accompanied by ever-changing governments through revolutions and coups? A possible explanation is that when corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it even if everybody would be better off without it. Two models involving strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria attempt to illustrate this formally.

Political corruption --- Boss rule --- Corruption (in politics) --- Graft in politics --- Malversation --- Political scandals --- Politics, Practical --- Corruption --- Misconduct in office --- Economic aspects. --- Corrupt practices --- Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Criminology --- Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law --- Formal and Informal Sectors --- Shadow Economy --- Institutional Arrangements --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Labor Economics: General --- Public Enterprises --- Public-Private Enterprises --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Public finance & taxation --- Labour --- income economics --- Civil service & public sector --- Expenditure --- Public sector --- Civil service --- Crime --- Economic sectors --- Expenditures, Public --- Labor economics --- Finance, Public --- Haiti