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Examines the political determinants of recent reforms to monetary policy institutions in the industrial democracies

Banks and banking, Central. --- Monetary policy. --- Monetary management --- Banker's banks --- Banks, Central --- Central banking --- Central banks --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Banks and banking --- Banks and banking, Central --- Monetary policy --- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS --- Banks & Banking --- E-books

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This paper reviews the reserve requirement arrangements of sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on the differences between reserve requirements on domestic- and foreign-currency deposits. The reserve requirement systems in sub-Saharan Africa are relatively simple and transparent, but in some countries high unremunerated reserve ratios impose a significant implicit tax on the banks. The currency denomination of the foreign-currency reserve deposits raises concern in countries undergoing large macroeconomic changes or experiencing exchange rate volatility.

Banks and Banking --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Monetary Policy --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Monetary economics --- Banking --- Bank deposits --- Reserve requirements --- Currencies --- Monetary base --- Financial services --- Monetary policy --- Money --- Open market operations --- Central banks --- Banks and banking --- Money supply --- São Tomé and Príncipe, Democratic Republic of

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Our proposal draws on the premise that the availability of stable demand deposits for bank lending, in the process of which inside money is created, does not require any act of intentional saving. The mechanism allowing banks to lend deposits does not function well in low-income countries, owing to a number of structural constraints. We argue that separating inside money creation from lending, and distributing it on a nonlending basis to depositors through specialized payment service institutions, could broaden access to financial resources, fuel non-inflationary, demand-led growth; and foster financial deepening, diversification, and stability. We also argue that the proposed reform is consistent with market incentives and sound economic management.

Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Industries: Financial Services --- Capital Budgeting --- Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banking --- Finance --- Monetary economics --- Liquidity --- Bank credit --- Purchasing power --- Loans --- Asset and liability management --- Financial institutions --- Money --- National accounts --- Currency issuance --- Central banks --- Banks and banking --- Economics --- Credit --- Income --- United States

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Despite its importance, the issue of financial sector regulatory and supervisory independence (RSI) has received only marginal attention in literature and practice. However, experience has demonstrated that improper supervisory arrangements have contributed significantly to the deepening of several recent systemic banking crises. In this paper we argue that RSI is important for financial stability for the same reasons that central bank independence is important for monetary stability. The paper lays out four key dimensions of RSI-regulatory, supervisory, institutional and budgetary-and discusses ways to achieve them. We also discuss institutional arrangements needed to make independence work in practice. The key issue in this respect is that agency independence and accountability need to go hand in hand. The paper discusses a number of accountability arrangements.

Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Industries: Financial Services --- Business and Financial --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Regulated Industries and Administrative Law --- Regulation and Industrial Policy: General --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Banking --- Finance --- Financial services law & regulation --- Central bank autonomy --- Financial sector stability --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Financial sector --- Central banks --- Bank supervision --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Economic sectors --- Banks and banking --- Financial services industry --- Law and legislation --- State supervision --- United States

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Banks and banking, Central --- Foreign exchange rates --- Monetary policy --- Econometric models --- Monetary management --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Exchange rates --- Fixed exchange rates --- Flexible exchange rates --- Floating exchange rates --- Fluctuating exchange rates --- Foreign exchange --- Rates of exchange --- Banker's banks --- Banks, Central --- Central banking --- Central banks --- Banks and banking --- Rates --- Theses