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The President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security proposed three reform plans. Two, analyzed here, restore actuarial balance in the absence of individual accounts. One achieves this balance solely through benefit reductions. The other uses new dedicated revenue to cover one-third of the actuarial deficit, reducing benefits to close the rest. Both plans cut disability and young survivor benefits in step with retirement benefits, while bolstering benefits for long-career low earners and surviving spouses with low benefits. The plans both include voluntary individual accounts that replace part of the scaled-back Social Security system. Payroll taxes are diverted to the accounts and one of the plans also requires a (subsidized) add-on contribution for those choosing accounts. Under both models, any payroll tax deposited in an individual account is also recorded in a 'liability account' for the worker. The liability account tracks the diverted payroll revenue (with interest) and is paid off by reducing traditional benefits. The individual accounts are subsidized through a sub-market interest rate on the liability accounts. This subsidy worsens the financial position of the Trust Fund. The accounts also create a cash-flow problem. Consequently, by themselves, the individual accounts make Social Security's solvency problems worse both in the short run and over the long run. To offset the adverse impact of the accounts, the plans call for large transfers of general revenues (despite substantial projected budget deficits). If all (two-thirds of) eligible workers opted for the accounts, the new revenues required over the next 75 years would amount to between 1.2 and 1.5 (0.8 and 1.1) percent of payroll. Holding the disabled harmless from the benefit reductions would raise the required transfers to between 1.5 and 1.7 (1.1 and 1.3) percent of payroll (compared to a projected actuarial deficit of 1.9 percent of payroll under current law). Despite requiring this much general revenue relative to paying scheduled benefits, the plans would produce significant reductions in expected combined benefits. At the end of 75 years, however, assets in the accounts would amount to between 53 and 66 (35 and 44) percent of GDP, and the value to Social Security of the accumulated liabilities that reduce later benefits would amount to more than 20 (15) percent of GDP.
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This is the introduction to and summary of the second stage of a international research project to study the relationship between social security provisions and retirement. The project relies on the analyses of a large group of economists in 12 countries who conduct the analysis for each of their countries. In the first stage we documented the enormous disincentives for continued work at older ages in many countries. The introduction to the first volume from the project concluded with a striking graph showing a strong relationship across countries between social security program incentives to retire and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force. The results in this volume show the large magnitude of these effects. Across 12 countries with very different social security programs and labor market institutions, the results consistently show that program incentives accord strongly with retirement decisions. The magnitude is illustrated by the simulations reported in each country paper. Considering the average across all countries, a reform that delays benefit eligibility by three years would likely reduce the proportion of men 56 to 65 out of the labor force between 23 and 36 percent, perhaps closer to 36 percent in the long run. On the other hand, an illustrative common reform'-- with early retirement at age 60, normal retirement age 65, and actuarial reduction in benefits between 65 and 60--has very disparate effects across the countries, depending on the provisions of the current program in each country. There is a strong correspondence between the simulation results and a priori expectations. The results leave little doubt that social security incentives have a strong effect on retirement decisions. And the estimates show that the effect is similar in countries with very different cultural histories, labor market institutions, and other social characteristics. While countries may differ in many respects, the employees in all countries react similarly to social security retirement incentives. The simulated effects of illustrative reforms reported in the country papers make clear that changes in the provisions of social security programs would have very large effects on the labor force participation of older employees.
Retirement income. --- Older people --- Social security. --- Employment.
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Pensions --- Pension trusts --- Retirement income --- United States.
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Retirees --- Retirement income --- Saving and investment --- Finance, Personal --- Planning
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Retirement income --- Defined contribution pension plans --- Pensions --- Planning. --- Business & economics
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Steel industry and trade --- Retirement income --- Health planning --- Employees. --- Planning. --- Technology & engineering --- Business & economics --- Political science
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Business failures --- Retirement income --- Pensions --- Enron Corp. --- Accounting. --- Auditing. --- Corrupt practices. --- Enron corp. --- Corporations --- Business & economics
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When it was first published, What If Boomers Can't Retire? predicted what would happen when boomers switched from buying stocks to selling them for retirement income. Since then-and as predicted by author Thornton Parker-stocks have become less important, prices have declined, corporations have shifted their emphasis from inflating stocks to just surviving, and there is currently a recession in full swing.This book shows that there is a bright side, however. If enough boomers work in their later years and preserve their capital, and if the country improves the way it uses capital, the results
Retirement income --- Stocks --- Financial security. --- Baby boom generation --- Planning. --- Prices --- Social aspects. --- Economic aspects.
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Finance, Personal --- Health insurance --- Old age pensions --- Retirement income --- Social security --- Forecasting --- Planning
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