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Based on cross-country data for up to 78 countries, this paper shows that fiscal decentralization-the assignment of expenditure and revenue mobilization functions to subnational levels of government-is associated with various indicators of governance, such as corruption, rule of law, and government effectiveness. Unlike previous studies in the decentralization/governance literature, which focus primarily on expenditure-based measures of decentralization, the results reported in this paper show that the relationship between decentralization and governance depends on how subnational expenditures are financed. The higher the share in total subnational revenues of nontax revenues and grants and transfers from higher levels of government, the stronger the association between decentralization and governance.

Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Criminology --- State and Local Government --- Intergovernmental Relations: General --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Fiscal Policy --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Revenue mobilization --- Fiscal federalism --- Expenditure --- Revenue administration --- Fiscal policy --- Crime --- Expenditures, Public --- Revenue --- Belgium --- White-collar crime

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Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process.

Forest management --- Forest policy --- Logging --- Timber --- Rent (Economic theory) --- Economic rent --- Ground-rent --- Economics --- Land use --- Rent seeking --- Forest production --- Building materials --- Forest products --- Lumber trade --- Forests and forestry --- Lumber --- Tree farms --- Trees --- Wood --- Forest harvesting --- Pulpwood --- Harvesting --- Lumbering --- Forestry engineering --- Forest resource policy --- State and forestry --- Economic policy --- Forest administration --- Forest plants --- Forest resource administration --- Forest resource management --- Forest stewardship --- Forest vegetation management --- Forestry management --- Stewardship, Forest --- Vegetation management, Forest --- Ecosystem management --- Natural resources --- Environmental aspects --- Economic aspects --- Government policy --- Management --- Administration --- Control --- Rent (Economic theory). --- Social Sciences --- Political Science

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This paper seeks to contribute to the unresolved issue of the effect of economic integration on environmental policy. In particular, we discuss the joint impact of trade openness and political uncertainty. Our theory predicts that the effect of trade integreation on the environment is conditional on the degree of political uncertainty. Trade integration raises the stringency of environmental policies, but the effect is reduced when the degree of political uncertainty is great. Political uncertainty has a positive effect on environmental policy as it reduces lobbying efforts. Applying our model to a unique data set of primarily developing countries, the empirical findings support the theory and are robust under alterntive specifications.

Exports and Imports --- Taxation --- Environmental Policy --- Criminology --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation --- Trade Policy --- International Trade Organizations --- Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy --- Environmental Economics: Government Policy --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities --- Redistributive Effects --- Environmental Taxes and Subsidies --- Financial Aspects of Economic Integration --- Economic Integration --- Environmental policy & protocols --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Public finance & taxation --- International economics --- Environmental policy --- Environmental taxes --- Trade integration --- Economic integration --- Environment --- Crime --- Taxes --- Environmental impact charges --- International economic integration --- Argentina --- White-collar crime