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Pigou's conjecture was that under costly taxation public expenditures should not reach the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. In the treatment here, public expenditures (and environmental protection) may provide public goods for consumption but also collective inputs for production. When the benefits are in production, the cost of funds is irrelevant. Why? Collective inputs benefit goods that are taxed, while for public goods the shadow price of funds reduces provision as if they were.

Environmental protection --- Expenditures, Public --- Public goods --- Taxation --- Economic aspects --- Costs

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This book provides an integrated treatment of the relationship between political economy and vocational education at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Approaching the subject from a philosophical perspective the author engages with debates about* the work-related aims of education * the moral and spiritual significance of work * the conceptualisation of political economy * high-skill economies and vocational education* the 'end of work' thesis* the relationship between education and training in vocational education * future work patterns * the education

Vocational education --- Infrastructure (Economics) --- Philosophy. --- Economic aspects. --- Education, Vocational --- Vocational training --- Work experience --- Capital, Social (Economics) --- Economic infrastructure --- Social capital (Economics) --- Social infrastructure --- Social overhead capital --- Education --- Technical education --- Economic development --- Human settlements --- Public goods --- Public works --- Capital

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This paper analyzes the link between FDI, corporate taxation, and corporate tax revenues. We find strong evidence that FDI in (out) flows are affected by tax regimes in the host (home) countries and FDI flows in turn affect the corporate tax base. Simulations of European Union (EU) harmonization (isolating the revenue effect of FDI on the tax base from direct effects through the rate harmonization) suggest that high (low) tax countries would gain (lose) revenue from harmonization; these effects may be substantial. Our results also suggest that EU tax harmonization would significantly affect the net FDI position of some countries.

Exports and Imports --- Public Finance --- Taxation --- Corporate Taxation --- Business Taxes and Subsidies --- International Fiscal Issues --- International Public Goods --- International Investment --- Long-term Capital Movements --- International Policy Coordination and Transmission --- Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: Forecasting and Simulation --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Corporate & business tax --- Finance --- Public finance & taxation --- Foreign direct investment --- Corporate income tax --- Corporate taxes --- Revenue administration --- Tax harmonization --- Balance of payments --- Taxes --- Corporations --- Investments, Foreign --- Revenue --- United States

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#SBIB:044.HIVA --- #SBIB:316.334.5U12 --- #SBIB:316.334.5U20 --- Sociologie van stad en platteland: ruimtelijke ordening --- Sociologie van stad (buurt, wijk, community, stadsvernieuwing) --- Infrastructure (Economics) --- Regional planning --- Transportation --- Geografie --- Planning --- Landschapskunde --- Zorg en Planning. --- Public transportation --- Transport --- Transportation, Primitive --- Transportation companies --- Transportation industry --- Regional development --- State planning --- Capital, Social (Economics) --- Economic infrastructure --- Social capital (Economics) --- Social infrastructure --- Social overhead capital --- Economic aspects --- Government policy --- Locomotion --- Commerce --- Communication and traffic --- Storage and moving trade --- Human settlements --- Land use --- City planning --- Landscape protection --- Economic development --- Public goods --- Public works --- Capital

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Alexander Schuessler has done what many deemed impossible: he has wedded rational choice theory and the concerns of social theory and anthropology to explain why people vote. The "paradox of participation"--why individuals cast ballots when they have virtually no effect on electoral outcomes--has long puzzled social scientists. And it has particularly troubled rational choice theorists, who like to describe political activity in terms of incentives. Schuessler's ingenious solution is a "logic of expressive choice." He argues in incentive-based (or "economic") terms that individuals vote not because of how they believe their vote matters in the final tally but rather to express their preferences, allegiances, and thus themselves. Through a comparative history of marketing and campaigning, Schuessler generates a "jukebox model" of participation and shows that expressive choice has become a target for those eliciting mass participation and public support. Political advisers, for example, have learned to target voters' desire to express--to themselves and to others--who they are. Candidates, using tactics such as claiming popularity, invoking lifestyle, using ambiguous campaign themes, and shielding supporters from one another can get out their vote even when it is clear that an election is already lost or won. This important work, the first of its kind, will appeal to anyone seeking to decipher voter choice and turnout, social movements, political identification, collective action, and consumer behavior, including scholars, graduate students, and upper-level undergraduates in political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, and marketing. It will contribute greatly to our understanding and prediction of democratic participation patterns and their consequences.

Rational choice theory --- Voting --- Political participation --- Rational choice theory. --- Social choice --- Ansolabehere, Stephen. --- Appadurai, Arjun. --- Bartels, Larry. --- Bonaccorso, John. --- Brennan, Geoffrey. --- Carter, Jimmy. --- Clinton, Bill. --- Diamond, Edwin. --- Durkheim, Emile. --- Edelman, Murray. --- Eisenhower, Dwight D. --- Ferejohn, John. --- Giddens, Anthony. --- Goodman, Robert. --- Haug, Wolfgang. --- Herbst, Susan. --- Hotelling, Harold. --- Iyengar, Shanto. --- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. --- Johnson, Lyndon. --- King, Gary. --- Lennon, John. --- Lennons Problem. --- Lifestyle. --- Mickelson, Sig. --- Nagler, Jonathan. --- Nixon, Richard. --- Olson, Mancur. --- Page, Benjamin. --- Riker, William. --- Scib. --- Tedlow, Richard. --- Verba, Sidney. --- Walker, Mary. --- Wright, Gerald. --- abstention. --- bandwagons (momentum). --- biographical narratives. --- chaos theorem. --- commodification. --- composition of utility. --- electoral campaigns. --- expressive tipping model. --- free-riding. --- identity (attachment). --- marketing. --- opinion polls. --- paradox of participation. --- participation costs. --- public goods. --- rational ignorance. --- selective incentives. --- snob-good. --- turnout. --- Voting. --- Political participation. --- Balloting --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Suffrage --- Citizen participation --- Community action --- Community involvement --- Community participation --- Involvement, Community --- Mass political behavior --- Participation, Citizen --- Participation, Community --- Participation, Political --- Political activity --- Political behavior --- Political rights --- Social participation --- Political activists