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Sex (Psychology) --- Internet --- Sexology --- Sexualité (Psychologie) --- Sexologie --- Computer sex --- Internet users --- Sexual behavior --- Sexualité (Psychologie) --- Internet users - France - Sexual behavior
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Internet access for library users --- Public libraries --- Data processing. --- United States.
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"Dealing with Difficult People in the Library offers practical strategies for managing problems posed by patrons and staff. It is the best hands-on guide to solving problems through communication, preventive measures, and clear and concise patron behavior policies." "Communication skills are at the heart of resolving difficult situations and ensuring that simple encounters don't escalate into real problems. Recognizing the difference between a patron with a simple problem and a real security risk takes skill and understanding. Knowing how to deal with both situations effectively is a challenge. Dealing with Difficult People in the Library will arm you with the skills and the ability needed."--Jacket.
Public services (Libraries) --- Communication in library science --- Public libraries --- Library administration. --- Interpersonal relations. --- Social Sciences --- Library & Information Science --- Library science --- Libraries --- Libraries and readers --- Library public services --- Library services to users --- Library users --- Human relations --- Interpersonal relationships --- Personal relations --- Relations, Interpersonal --- Relationships, Interpersonal --- Social behavior --- Social psychology --- Object relations (Psychoanalysis) --- Library management --- Management --- County libraries --- Libraries, County --- Security measures --- Public relations. --- Public relations --- Public services --- Services to users --- Services for --- Administration --- Organization
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April 2000 - Demand for AIDS vaccines varies by level of risk and by national wealth. At-risk individuals in poor countries suffer on both counts. Providing funds to develop and distribute AIDS vaccines should be a global concern. Bishai, Lin, and Kiyonga delineate two different algorithms for the purchase of AIDS vaccines, to show how differences in policy objectives can greatly affect projections of the number of courses of vaccine that will be needed. They consider a hypothetical vaccine costing USD 10 to produce, and offering 60 percent, 75 percent, and 90 percent reductions in the risk of HIV for 10 years. For each of the world's 10 major geographic divisions, they use published estimates of the risk of AIDS, the value of medical costs averted, and the value of potential productivity losses. Under the health sector algorithm - in which purchases are made to minimize the impact of AIDS/HIV on government health spending - 766 million courses of vaccine would be purchased. Under the societal algorithm - in which purchases are made to minimize the impact of AIDS/HIV on health spending and GDP - more than 3.7 billion courses of vaccine would be purchased. Under an equity model - allocating vaccines to everyone in the world at high risk as if they had the financial resources of Western Europeans - vaccine would be offered to 4.7 billion people. For a Western European man, reducing the risk of HIV/AIDS would be a USD 789 concern; in Africa, the comparable risk would be a USD 48,577 crisis. The authors conclude that financing AIDS vaccines solely on the fixed budget of a ministry of health means large vulnerable populations wouldn't receive the vaccine. Allocating the vaccine based on society's ability to pay would still exclude many poor infants who would probably be immunized if they were born in more developed regions. Policymakers concerned about equity in health care must redouble efforts to making the financing of development and distribution of AIDS vaccines a global, not a regional, concern. This paper was commissioned by the World Bank AIDS Vaccine Task Force, co-chaired by Poverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group and the Health, Nutrition, and Population Team, Human Development Network. David Bishai may be contacted at dbishai@jhsph.edu.
AIDS HIV --- Bereavement --- Children --- Disease Control and Prevention --- Drug Users --- Epidemiology --- Families --- Health Care --- Health Monitoring and Evaluation --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Hepatitis B --- Hygiene --- Influenza --- Morbidity --- Patient --- Patients --- People --- Public Health --- Risk Groups --- Sex Workers --- Strategy --- Vaccination --- Victims --- Workers
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June 1999 - Empirical analysis of telecommunications reforms in 30 African and Latin American countries yields results largely consistent with conventional wisdom. Competition seems to be the most successful change agent, so granting even temporary monopolies may delay the arrival of better services to consumers. Reformers are correct to emphasize that regulatory reform accompany privatization, as privatization without regulation reform may be costly to consumers. Wallsten explores the effects of privatization, competition, and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 African and Latin American countries from 1984 through 1997. Competition is associated with tangible benefits in terms of mainline penetration, number of pay phones, connection capacity, and reduced prices. Fixed-effects regressions reveal that competition-measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent telecommunications provider-is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines, pay phones, and connection capacity, and with decreases in the price of local calls. Privatizing an incumbent is negatively correlated with mainline penetration and connection capacity. Privatization combined with regulation by an independent regulator, however, is positively correlated with connection capacity and substantially mitigates privatization's negative correlation with mainline penetration. Reformers are right to emphasize a combination of privatization, competition, and regulation. But researchers must explore the permutations of regulation: What type of regulation do countries adopt (price caps versus cost-of-service, for example)? How does the regulatory agency work? What is its annual budget? How many employees does it have? Where do the regulators come from? What sort of training and experience do they have? What enforcement powers does the regulatory agency have? In addition, researchers must deal with endogeneity of privatization, competition, and regulation to deal with issues of causality. This paper-a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group-is part of a larger research effort to analyze the role of competition in telecommunications with special emphasis on Africa. The author may be contacted at wallsten@stanford.edu.
Banks and Banking Reform --- Business --- Business Services --- Data --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Education --- Emerging Markets --- ICT Policy and Strategies --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Infrastructure Regulation --- Institutions --- Knowledge Economy --- Knowledge for Development --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Performance --- Price --- Prices --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Regulation --- Reliability --- Results --- Social Protections and Labor --- Technology --- Telecom --- Telecommunication --- Telecommunication Reforms --- Telecommunications --- Telephone --- Telephone Connections --- Telephone Service --- Telephones --- User --- Users
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