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Income tax --- Flat-rate income tax --- Social security --- -Guaranteed annual income --- Social choice --- Finance

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Political philosophy. Social philosophy --- Individuation (Philosophy). --- Privacy. --- Social choice. --- Individuation (Philosophy) --- Privacy --- Social choice --- Academic collection --- #A9710A --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics --- Secrecy --- Solitude --- Individuals (Philosophy) --- Individuation --- Particulars (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Haecceity (Philosophy)

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Austrian school of economics. --- Liberalism. --- Social choice. --- Austrian school of economics --- Liberalism --- Social choice --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics --- Liberal egalitarianism --- Liberty --- Political science --- Social sciences --- Austrian school of economists --- Marginalist school of economics --- Schools of economics --- Marginal utility

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Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.

Microeconomics --- Operational research. Game theory --- Social choice --- Mathematical models --- Coalition (Social sciences) --- Economic theory. --- Econometrics. --- Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Social sciences --- Economic man --- Economics, Mathematical --- Statistics

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Public choice theory should be taken seriously-but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions.While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.

Legislation --- Administrative procedure --- Social choice --- Law - U.S. --- Law, Politics & Government --- Constitutional Law - U.S. --- Legislative process --- Law --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics