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This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.

Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Criminology --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy --- Labor Contracts --- Public Sector Labor Markets --- Comparative Studies of Countries --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- Labour --- income economics --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Civil service & public sector --- Civil service --- Public sector wages --- Income --- Crime --- National accounts --- Singapore --- Income economics --- White-collar crime