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This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle.

Labor --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Firm Behavior --- Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty --- Fiscal Policy --- Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits --- Private Pensions --- Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law --- Formal and Informal Sectors --- Shadow Economy --- Institutional Arrangements --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance --- Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Labour --- income economics --- Public finance & taxation --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Civil service & public sector --- Bonuses --- Tax evasion --- Income and capital gains taxes --- Tax administration core functions --- Crime --- Revenue administration --- Civil service --- Employee fringe benefits --- Income tax --- Tax administration and procedure --- Ghana