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How do we form and modify our beliefs about the world? It is widely accepted that what we believe is determined by evidence, and is therefore not directly under our control; but according to what criteria is the credibility of the evidence established? Professor Helm argues that no theory of knowledge is complete without standards for accepting and rejecting evidence as belief-worthy. These standards, or belief-policies, are not themselves determined by evidence, but determine what counts as credible evidence. Unlike single beliefs, belief-policies are directly subject to the will, and therefore to the possibility of weakness of will and self-deception. Helm sets out to interpret standard epistemological positions in terms of belief-policies, and to illustrate their operation in the history of philosophy. He establishes connections between belief-policies, responsibility for beliefs, and the desirability of toleration, before reassessing fideism in the light of his argument.

Belief and doubt --- Croyance (Philosophie) --- Croyance (Psychologie) --- Croyance et doute --- Doute --- Doute méthodique --- Geloof en twijfel --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Skepticism --- Arts and Humanities --- Belief and doubt.

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Historical thought, whether it is expressed in writing or through works of art, inevitably contains elements of fiction. Thus in every phase of the development of historical thinking the question arises: were these fictional elements recognized and if so, how was their function perceived? Was any effort made to distinguish between a documented fact and any assumptions or deductions related to it? In examining the past, was it deemed important to curb the free play of imagination or was it thought that any explanation, no matter how fanciful and irrational, was better than none? This is the question that this book attempts to answer. In doing so, it examines a rich variety of texts and also some works of art ranging from the Ancient Near East to the nineteenth century.

History as a science --- Philosophy --- anno 1700-1799 --- anno 1400-1499 --- anno 1900-1999 --- anno 1800-1899 --- anno 1600-1699 --- anno 1500-1599 --- Belief and doubt --- Connaissance [Théorie de la ] --- Criticism [Historical ] --- Critique historique --- Croyance (Philosophie) --- Croyance (Psychologie) --- Croyance et doute --- Doute --- Doute méthodique --- Epistemologie --- Epistemology --- Epistémologie --- Geloof en twijfel --- Geschiedkundige methodologie --- Geschiedschrijving --- Geschiedschrijving--Methodologie --- Historical criticism --- Historical method --- Historical methodology --- Historicism --- Historicisme --- Historiografie --- Historiographie --- Historiography --- Historische kritiek --- Historische methode --- Historische methodologie --- Historisme --- History--Criticism --- Kenleer --- Kennisleer --- Kennistheorie --- Kentheorie --- Knowledge [Theory of ] --- Kritiek [Historische ] --- Methodologie [Historische ] --- Methodology [Historical ] --- Theorie of knowledge --- Theorievorming --- Théorie de la connaissance --- History --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Histoire --- Philosophie --- Historicism. --- Historiography. --- Belief and doubt. --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Philosophy. --- -Historicism --- Theory of knowledge --- Psychology --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Skepticism --- Authorship --- Annals --- Auxiliary sciences of history --- Criticism --- Théorie de la connaissance --- History, Modern --- Légendes et histoire. --- Historiographie. --- Philosophie de l'histoire. --- Croyance (philosophie) --- Historicisme. --- Théorie de la connaissance.